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PRIVATE SCHOOLS’ ROLE AND RIGHTS IN SETTING
VACCINATION POLICY: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PUZZLE
HILLEL Y. LEVIN*
ABSTRACT
Measles and other vaccine-preventable childhood diseases are
making a comeback, as a growing number of parents are electing not
to vaccinate their children. May private schools refuse admission to
these students? This deceptively simple question raises complex
issues of First Amendment law and statutory interpretation, and it
also has implications for other current hot-button issues in constitu-
tional law, including whether private schools may discriminate
against LGBTQ students. This Article is the first to address the issue
of private schools’ rights to exclude unvaccinated children. It finds
that the answer is “it depends.” It also offers a model law that states
should adopt to explicitly allow private schools to adopt policies to
exclude unvaccinated children.
* Alex W. Smith Professor of Law at the University of Georgia School of Law. The
author is grateful to Rachel Tropper for her terrific research assistance and to colleagues at
the University of Georgia School of Law, Emory Law School, and University of Tennessee
College of Law for their thoughtful feedback and suggestions.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2019, there were more than 1200 cases of measles reported in
the United States, which is more than the total number of cases in
the previous four years combined.1 The last time the total number
of cases of measles topped the millennium mark in an entire year
was 1992.2 Although the numbers this year are especially striking,
this development reflects a broader trend line of the rising incidence
of vaccine-preventable childhood illnesses.3 In the wake of every
major outbreak of these diseases, public health advocates, policy-
makers, and academics inevitably call for tighter vaccination laws
and other means of increasing vaccination rates.4 Sometimes laws
change, but more often, they do not.5
Meanwhile, many private schools—which tend to have higher
nonvaccination rates than public schools6 and have been loci of
outbreaks and drivers of regional epidemics7—have begun to
1. Measles Cases and Outbreaks, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/measles/cases-outbreaks.html [https://perma.cc/BXA2-2V3Q].
2. Julia Ries, Disneyland the Site of Another Measles Exposure, HEALTHLINE (Oct. 23,
2019), https://www.healthline.com/ health-news/measles-cases-worst-since-1994-how-bad-will-
it-get [https://perma.cc/B7ZF-HV54].
3. Reported Cases and Deaths from Vaccine Preventable Diseases, United States, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (May 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/
pinkbook/downloads/appendices/E/reported-cases.pdf [https://perma.cc/AVF4-UKHV].
4. See Following Measles Outbreaks, More States Are Considering Removing Personal
Exemptions to Vaccinations, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 1, 2019), https://khn.org/morning-
breakout/following-measles-outbreaks-more-states-are-considering-removing-personal-
exemptions-to-vaccinations/ [https://perma.cc/MUU6-DEWC]; Patti Neighmond, States Move
to Restrict Parents’ Refusal to Vaccinate Their Kids, NPR (Feb. 28, 2019, 3:06 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/02/28/698606894/states-move-to-restrict-
parents-refusal-to-vaccinate-their-kids [https://perma.cc/97BY-NZAZ].
5. See Saad B. Omer et al., Legislative Challenges to School Immunization Mandates,
2009-2012, 311 JAMA 620, 620-21 (2014).
6. Jana Shaw et al., United States Private Schools Have Higher Rates of Exemptions to
School Immunization Requirements than Public Schools, 165 J. PEDIATRICS 129, 131-32
(2014).
7. See Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, Bastion of Anti-Vaccine Fervor: Progressive Waldorf
Schools, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/13/nyregion/measles-
outbreak-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/NW8N-RVXK]; Laurel Wamsley, Chickenpox
Outbreak Hits N.C. Private School with Low Vaccination Rates, NPR (Nov. 20, 2018, 4:00 PM),
https://www.npr.org/ 2018/11/20/669644191/chickenpox-outbreak-hits-n-c-private-school-with-
low-vaccination-rates [https://perma.cc/59HU-UU5J].
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consider refusing admission to students who are not vaccinated.8
The problem is that some state laws appear to prohibit them from
doing so.9 The law here is frustratingly unclear, and the legal
questions involve complex issues of both statutory and constitu-
tional interpretation. This Article is the first to address this issue.
In so doing, it exposes deep questions of First Amendment law that
extend well beyond the context of vaccination.
On the statutory side, do vaccination mandates and exemptions
apply to private schools at all? Here, the answer is “sometimes,” for
it depends on states’ statutory schemes, the courts in each state,
and even the type of private school.10 On the constitutional side, the
issues are even more complex, as they implicate three foundational
values: individuals’ rights to be free from the burden and costs of
others’ religious practices; other individuals’ freedoms of religion
and conscience; and institutions’ religious autonomy and associa-
tional rights. When it comes to the issue of private schools’ vaccina-
tion policies, these values and interests are on a collision course.
In untangling this mess of statutes and undertheorized constitu-
tional values, this Article finds that the law is, well, a mess. In some
states, all private schools might have a statutory right to reject
vaccination exemptions; in other states, only religious schools have
8. See NM v. Hebrew Acad. Long Beach, 155 F. Supp. 3d 247, 249-52 (E.D.N.Y. 2016)
(school required parent to undergo sincerity inquiry and rejected claim for exemption; parent
sued); Bowden v. Iona Grammar Sch., 726 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686 (App. Div. 2001) (school excluded
child after rejecting claim for nonmedical exemption); Immunization Policy, DIOCESE
ORLANDO, https://www.orlandodiocese.org/ministries-offices/schools/schools-parent-informa
tion/schools-immunization-policy [https://perma.cc/F9LL-LWBA]; Dave Schechter, Measles
Outbreak Has Atlanta Rabbis Concerned, ATLANTA JEWISH TIMES (Nov. 28, 2018, 11:03 AM),
https://atlantajewishtimes.timesofisrael.com/measles-outbreak-has-atlanta-rabbis-concerned
[https://perma.cc/DRX2-7XFC]; Jack Shea, Cleveland Heights Private School Mandates
Vaccinations for Students, FOX 8 CLEV. (Nov. 27, 2018, 4:36 PM), https://fox8.com/2018/11/
27/cleveland-heights-private-schools-mandates-vaccinations-for-students [https://perma.cc/
T8T3-C3ML]; Temple Israel Vaccination Policy, TEMPLE ISR., https://images.shulcloud.
com/1267/uploads/docs/vaccination-policy-8-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XNB-SSQ2]; see also,
e.g., Flynn v. Estevez, 221 So. 3d 1241, 1243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017); Rubinstein v. Temple
Isr. Early Learning Ctr., No. 335101, 2018 WL 1020509, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2018);
K.M. ex rel. A.M. v. Pixie Nursery Sch., No. 17344, 2018 WL 1428062, at *1-2 (N.Y.S. Educ.
Dep’t Mar. 13, 2018); Jacoba Urist, How Schools Are Dealing with Anti-Vaccine Parents,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/02/schools-may-
solve-the-anti-vaccine-parenting-deadlock/38520 [https://perma.cc/25LG-8378].
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Part II.B.
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statutory permission to do so; and in yet other states, no private
schools are granted such a right.11 Meanwhile, some religious
private schools have the constitutional right to reject exemptions,
some nonreligious private schools might have a similar right, and
some private schools probably do not.12 This state of affairs is
troubling for three reasons. First, it leaves a great deal of uncer-
tainty for private schools. Second, there are deep constitutional
problems with a regime that allows religious private schools to
reject vaccination exemptions but that denies that right to similarly
situated nonreligious private schools. And finally, it leaves children
unnecessarily vulnerable to dangerous, debilitating, and life-
threatening illnesses.
With this Article, I hope to make four important and different
kinds of contributions. First, the Article describes the law as it
currently stands. For at least some private schools, I offer clear
answers, and for others, I can at least clarify the issues and the
legal landscape. Second, I offer practical solutions to this problem
by recommending that states clarify their statutes to allow private
schools to exclude students who are unvaccinated for nonmedical
reasons, and I offer clear statutory language to do so. I also suggest
ways in which the judicial and administrative branches can help.
Third, I explore the complex and heretofore undertheorized
relationship between the First Amendment’s religious autonomy
and associational freedom doctrines, particularly as they relate to
private schools. Finally, I show that the issues raised by the
seemingly narrow question of private schools’ vaccination policies
have far-reaching implications for some contemporary and hot-
button social and constitutional questions.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I offers a brief introduction
to vaccines and vaccination law. It also describes the dangers
associated with nonvaccination and the necessity of high vaccination
compliance rates. Part II then introduces the particular context of
private schools and considers how states’ statutes mandating
vaccination apply to them. It also assesses whether private schools
may and should conduct sincerity inquiries to determine whether
individual claimants for vaccination exemptions are entitled to
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. See infra Part III.
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them. Part III addresses the complex constitutional questions
involved when private schools choose to exclude nonvaccinated
children from admission. It finds some clarity, some lack of clarity,
and some troubling practical and constitutional implications. Part
IV then explores these implications and offers concrete solutions.
Finally, the Article concludes by exposing and briefly addressing
the much broader questions implicated by the religious and
associational freedoms analyses. When may private schools dis-
criminate and on what basis? Against whom? What other state
statutes may they ignore? On what constitutional grounds? These
questions have particular salience today, in a parallel context: do
religious organizations have a constitutional right to exclude or
discriminate against people on the basis of sexual orientation or
sexual identity despite states’ laws guaranteeing LGBTQ equality?
I. VACCINATION MANDATES AND EXEMPTIONS: WHAT AND WHY?
Vaccines have been among the most successful public health
interventions in history.13 Mandatory vaccinations in the United
States provide protection from diseases that once threatened to wipe
out communities.14 These diseases are now eradicated, preventable,
or manageable.15 Among children born between 1994 and 2013,
routine childhood vaccination will have prevented roughly 322
million cases of disease and 732,000 deaths, with an estimated net
cost savings of $1.38 trillion.16
Nevertheless, the choice of a relatively small but growing minor-
ity of parents to opt out of vaccination protocols puts the lives and
health of their children and, crucially, others in the community as
13. See generally Pauline W. Chen, Putting Us All at Risk for Measles, N.Y. TIMES (June
26, 2014), https://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/putting-us-all-at-risk-for-measles/
[https://perma.cc/UNZ7-TYAB] (noting a major resurgence in measles in 2014 due to parents
who chose not to vaccinate their children).
14. See Ten Great Public Health Achievements—United States, 2001-2010, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (May 26, 2011), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/mm6019a5.htm [https://perma.cc/U8PG-7VKU].
15. Id.
16. Holly A. Hill et al., National, State, and Selected Local Area Vaccination Coverage
Among Children Aged 19-35 Months—United States, 2014, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Aug. 28, 2015), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6433a1.htm
[https://perma.cc/83CU-Q4JS].
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well, at risk. This Part briefly explains the importance of vacci-
nation, the dangers of nonvaccination, and reviews the statutory
landscape.
A. A Short Primer on Vaccination and Community Immunity
Vaccines work by introducing a benign pathogen into the body
that primes the immune system to fight off a related, dangerous
version of the pathogen.17 This process is safe. Complications from
mandatory vaccines are mild, and severe complications are exceed-
ingly rare and almost nonexistent.18 More than two dozen vaccines
against major diseases are available, and more are being
developed.19
Critically, vaccines’ efficacies go beyond their ability to immunize
the individuals who receive them. Once enough people in a commu-
nity are immunized through vaccination, the entire community
benefits from what is known as “community immunity,” or what is
more commonly (but less preferably) referred to as “herd
immunity.”20 Community immunity occurs when so many people in
17. Understanding How Vaccines Work, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (July
2018), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/conversations/downloads/vacsafe-understand-color-
office.pdf [https://perma.cc/73KK-RLQN].
18. Id.; see also Vaccine Information Statements: DTaP (Diphtheria, Tetanus, Pertussis),
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/
hcp/vis/vis-statements/dtap.html [https://perma.cc/89UE-V7S9]; Vaccine Information
Statements: Rotavirus, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 23, 2018),
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/ vis/vis-statements/rotavirus.html [https://perma.cc/9BGT-
Y573]. Although some people continue to express concerns that vaccines may cause autism
spectrum disorders, these claims have been debunked by all available scientific evidence. See
Neighmond, supra note 4; see also Frank DeStefano et al., Increasing Exposure to Antibody-
Stimulating Proteins and Polysaccharides in Vaccines Is Not Associated with Risk of Autism,
163 J. PEDIATRICS 561, 563 (2013) (finding that increasing exposure to vaccines during the
first two years of life was not related to the risk of developing an autism spectrum disorder).
19. MARK NAVIN, VALUES AND VACCINE REFUSAL: HARD QUESTIONS IN ETHICS,
EPISTEMOLOGY, AND HEALTH CARE 4 (2016).
20. Id. at 5 (“If a sufficiently large percentage of the population develops individual
immunity, then that population will possess ‘herd immunity.’”); see also Erwin Chemerinsky
& Michele Goodwin, Compulsory Vaccination Laws Are Constitutional, 110 NW. U. L. REV.
589, 600 (2016) (describing community immunity as a critical portion of the population
becoming vaccinated and thus creating little opportunity for an outbreak); Allan J. Jacobs, Do
Belief Exemptions to Compulsory Vaccination Programs Violate the Fourteenth Amendment?,
42 U. MEM. L. REV. 73, 79 (2011) (explaining that community immunity is achieved “when the
fraction of the people who are immune to a disease is so great as to interrupt transmission of
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a group are immunized that the disease cannot reach any non-
immunized individuals that remain because the vectors of disease
transmission are effectively closed.21
The development and maintenance of community immunity is
critical because every society will have some who cannot, or will not,
be immunized. Some are too young to be vaccinated.22 Others cannot
be vaccinated for medical reasons.23 Yet others receive vaccines but
may not successfully develop complete immunity,24 and others’
immunity may have waned since having been vaccinated.25 Still
others are undervaccinated due to lack of access to healthcare or for
other socioeconomic reasons.26 Finally, and most problematically,
some parents choose not to have their children vaccinated, either
because of erroneous beliefs about the safety and efficacy of
vaccines, or for religious, philosophical, or other deeply felt personal
that disease by removing most potential targets of infection from the chain of transmission”).
21. Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 20, at 600; see also NAVIN, supra note 19, at 5.
22. For example, children cannot receive certain vaccines before reaching a certain age.
Who Should NOT Get Vaccinated with These Vaccines?, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vpd/should-not-vacc.html [https://perma.cc/UHJ2-
4V7E]; see also Recommended and Minimum Ages and Intervals Between Doses of Routinely
Recommended Vaccines, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
vaccines/pubs/pinkbook/downloads/appendices/a/age-interval-table.pdf [https://perma.cc/
JE6M-NUP3]. Some people can never be immunized against some diseases. NAVIN, supra note
19, at 5; see also Who Should NOT Get Vaccinated with These Vaccines?, supra. Others can
be vaccinated, but they will not be effectively immunized. NAVIN, supra note 19, at 5.
23. Who Should NOT Get Vaccinated with These Vaccines?, supra note 22.
24. NAVIN, supra note 19, at 5 (noting the importance of community immunity for the
members of the community who cannot be immunized effectively either because they are too
immunocompromised or because their vaccines failed to develop individual immunity); Jacobs,
supra note 20, at 82 (explaining that some people who receive a vaccine cannot develop
immunity to the disease: “For example, at least 10% of children fail to develop immunity to
pertussis vaccine after the recommended three injections”). Still others will not be vaccinated
because of a lack of medical care. Id.
25. Joseph A. Lewnard, Vaccine Waning and Mumps Re-emergence in the United States,
SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., Mar. 21, 2018, at 1, 5; Measles Prevention: Recommendations of
the Immunization Practices Advisory Committee (ACIP), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Dec. 29, 1989), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00041753.htm
[https://perma.cc/FT9X-AJHA]; Pertussis Frequently Asked Questions, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/pertussis/about/faqs.html
[https://perma.cc/DYS4-AQYP].
26. NAVIN, supra note 19, at 10.
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reasons.27 Consequently, society depends on community immunity
to avoid the spread of serious diseases.
Community immunity is only achieved once a large proportion of
a community is vaccinated. The vaccination rates necessary for
conferring community immunity differ by disease, with some
requiring as much as 95 percent of the population within a commu-
nity to be vaccinated in order to be successful.28 This situation
presents classic collective action and related free-rider problems:
parents can enjoy the benefits of community immunity without
internalizing the costs associated with having their own children
immunized. Consequently, some may avoid the costs—financial,
time, mild pain, and anxieties—of vaccination by choosing not to
vaccinate their children, and instead rely on others’ willingness to
vaccinate and thereby confer community immunity.29 But if enough
people opt out, then community immunity is threatened.
Recent high-profile outbreaks of vaccine-preventable illnesses
have occurred exclusively in communities with vaccination rates
below the levels necessary to maintain community immunity.30
Measles has been the most prevalent vaccine-preventable illness to
experience a comeback due to characteristics that make it especially
contagious and therefore necessitate high vaccination-compliance
27. Id. at 11 (“Many parents [who refuse to vaccinate] identify worries about health
considerations, but a smaller number of parents refuse vaccines for religious or philosophical
reasons.”).
28. Id. at 5; Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 20, at 600 (citing PAUL A. OFFIT, DEADLY
CHOICES: HOW THE ANTI-VACCINE MOVEMENT THREATENS US ALL 145 (rev. foreword 2015 ed.
2011)) (stating that highly contagious infections such as measles and pertussis require an
immunization rate of about 95 percent).
29. NAVIN, supra note 19, at 11 (writing that some parents choose not to vaccinate their
children “because they know that the high rates of vaccination in their communities mean
that their child is unlikely to be exposed to the diseases she is not vaccinated against”);
Jacobs, supra note 20, at 79-80 (asserting that community immunity allows some number of
free riders to benefit from the vaccination of others).
30. See Wamsley, supra note 7.
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rates.31 However, other vaccine-preventable illnesses have also
resurged due to low immunization rates.32
B. Mandatory Vaccination Laws in the United States and the
Threat to Community Immunity
States began to impose vaccination mandates in the nineteenth
century in order to reduce the likelihood and magnitude of disease
outbreaks.33 By prohibiting or limiting opt-outs from vaccination,
these requirements also help to eliminate the free-rider problem
and, thereby, to generate and maintain community immunity.
All fifty states require children to be vaccinated against a range
of diseases in order to attend public school.34 Nearly all states have
similar requirements for private schooling, while some also apply to
daycare centers and homeschooled children.35 However, state laws
also include provisions that allow for nonvaccination in some cases.
First, all states allow children to remain unvaccinated if vaccination
is contraindicated for medical reasons.36 Typically, this exemption
31. Aimee Cunningham, How Holes in Herd Immunity Led to a 25-Year High in U.S.
Measles Cases, SCIENCENEWS (Apr. 29, 2019, 4:04 PM), https://www.sciencenews.org/
article/holes-herd-immunity-led-25-year-high-us-measles-cases [https://perma.cc/AU2Q-
D5RE]; Measles Outbreak, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 2019),
https://www.cdc.gov/measles/downloads/fs-measles-outbreak-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DHD-
DMV8].
32. See James D. Cherry, Epidemic Pertussis in 2012—The Resurgence of a Vaccine-
Preventable Disease, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 785, 785 (2012); Eric Toner, Resurgence of Vaccine-
Preventable Childhood Diseases, JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCH. PUB. HEALTH, CTR. FOR
HEALTH SECURITY (July 3, 2014), http://www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/cbn/articles/2014/
cbnreport_07022014.html [https://perma.cc/2QS3-RV4Y].
33. NAVIN, supra note 19, at 7 (stating that in the nineteenth century, some states made
vaccines mandatory for children, especially for children who wished to attend school);
Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 20, at 598-99 (noting that all fifty states and the District
of Columbia have vaccination laws for public school children).
34. Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 20, at 598-99; Jacobs, supra note 20, at 74.
States’ requirements vary in the details, but mandatory vaccination laws typically require
children to receive vaccinations against mumps, measles, rubella, polio, tetanus, diphtheria,
pertussis, Haemophilus Influenzae Type b (Hib), hepatitis A, hepatitis B, rotavirus, varicella,
and pneumococcal disease in order to attend public schools. Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra
note 20, at 599; see School Vaccination Requirements and Exemptions, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/imz-managers/schoolvaxview/
requirements/index.html [https://perma.cc/B4SJ-D86H] (listing the mandatory vaccines for
every state in the United States).
35. Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 20, at 598-99.
36. Id. at 597-98.
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applies to those who are immunocompromised or too sick to with-
stand vaccination.37 The justification for this exemption is self-
evident and uncontroversial: vaccines are mandated in order to
protect a child’s health; if vaccinating the child would compromise
her health, it makes no sense to mandate it. Because these children
cannot be vaccinated, they depend entirely on community immunity.
More controversially, the overwhelming majority of states also
allow for nonvaccination for other reasons.38 Only five—Mississippi,
West Virginia, California, Maine, and New York—reject all non-
medical exemptions.39 Of the other forty-five states, most only
accommodate those who object to vaccination for religious reasons.40
The remaining states provide religious accommodations as well as
accommodations for those with moral, philosophical, or other con-
scientious objections to vaccination.41
Thus, the vast majority of states have opted to exempt those with
some nonmedical objections from vaccination requirements, and
nonvaccination persists. In pockets around the country, community
immunity has been threatened due to nonvaccination, with wide
geographic disparities in the proportion of vaccinated children.42 For
example,
[i]n 2009, the proportion of teens who received a recommended
booster of diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus vaccine ranged from
93.7% in Massachusetts to 52.7% in Arkansas and South
Carolina. Worse, in 2008, the number of young children receiv-
ing even one dose of measles-mumps-rubella vaccine ranged
from 95.6% in Tennessee to only 85.9% in Montana.43
In addition, some states with high rates of vaccination overall may
nevertheless have clusters of significantly undervaccinated pop-
ulations within bounded geographical areas of the state, or even
37. See id.
38. See States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from School Immunization
Requirements, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/school-
immunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/CLJ3-Y22F].
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Jacobs, supra note 20, at 81.
43. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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within individual schools.44 Thus, even when a state has high
vaccination rates overall, there are often microcommunities that are
vulnerable to contagion.
Although there has been an absence of continuous transmission
of measles in the United States, regular outbreaks still occur,
almost exclusively in communities or schools where substantial
proportions of the population opt not to vaccinate.45
Among the highest-profile recent outbreaks was a measles
epidemic that spread in California’s Disneyland amusement park,
caused 111 cases in seven states, and was exported to Mexico and
Canada.46 While the media attention and public dialogue resulting
from the Disneyland outbreak were intense, the outbreak was
hardly unusual. More recently, there was a major measles outbreak
in ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities in New York and New
Jersey.47 Indeed, New York experienced its most severe outbreak of
measles in decades, centered almost exclusively in ultra-Orthodox
Jewish communities in which parents send their children to reli-
gious private schools.48
Measles is not alone. Noncompliance with vaccination protocols
by a minority of parents has led to outbreaks of a variety of other
44. Liza Gross, Parents Who Shun Vaccines Tend to Cluster, Boosting Children’s Risk,
NPR (Jan. 20, 2015, 3:45 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015/01/20/
378630798/parents-who-shun-vaccines-tend-to-cluster-boosting-childrens-risk [https://
perma.cc/M59Y-Q2RW].
45. See, e.g., Karen Kaplan, Vaccine Refusal Helped Fuel Disneyland Measles Outbreak,
Study Says, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-
disneyland-measles-under-vaccination-20150316-story.html [https://perma.cc/4ZAG-96UE];
see also Katie M. Palmer, Why Did Vaccinated People Get Measles at Disneyland? Blame the
Unvaccinated, WIRED (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.wired.com/ 2015/01/vaccinated-people-get-
measles-disneyland-blame-unvaccinated/ [https://perma.cc/84ZQ-DUEA].
46. Nakia S. Clemmons et al., Measles—United States, January 4-April 2, 2015, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/mm6414a1.htm [https://perma.cc/R9AE-ZL4X].
47. Debra Goldschmidt, More than 760 Measles Cases in US, Most in New York, CNN
(May 6, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/06/health/measles-update-us-cases-764-cdc/
index.html [https://perma.cc/4YPJ-AL85]; Sharon Otterman, New York Confronts Its Worst
Measles Outbreak in Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/01/17/nyregion/measles-outbreak-jews-nyc.html [https://perma.cc/4WAA-PWUU]; Tyler
Pager, ‘Monkey, Rat and Pig DNA’: How Misinformation Is Driving the Measles Outbreak
Among Ultra-Orthodox Jews, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/09/
nyregion/jews-measles-vaccination.html [https://perma.cc/4QXJ-WYZ4].
48. Pager, supra note 47.
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serious diseases that should have long been eradicated through
vaccination, including pertussis, mumps, and polio.49
Public health advocates have responded to these outbreaks by
pushing for changes to the law, with a particular focus on eliminat-
ing nonmedical exemptions.50 For reasons I have explored else-
where, with few exceptions, these efforts have been fruitless.51 In
the meantime, public health officials, doctors, parents, caregivers,
and educators are doing what they can to prevent and contain
outbreaks.
II. PRIVATE SCHOOLS: THE PROBLEM AND THE LAW
Some private schools support parents’ choice not to vaccinate.52
Some parents choose to send their children to particular private
schools that share their values, including values that lead parents
49. The decline of community immunity has led to recent disease outbreaks, killing
hundreds and hospitalizing thousands more. See Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 20, at
601. The United States “has experienced outbreaks of pertussis, measles, and polio in recent
years.” Jacobs, supra note 20, at 80 (footnotes omitted). According to one commentator, “The
rise of exemptions to compulsory vaccination laws threatens to undermine the public health
achievements made possible by widespread immunizations.” Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra
note 20, at 601 (quoting Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So Many
Americans Opting Out of Vaccinating Their Children?, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 421
(2004)); see also Saad B. Omer et al., Geographic Clustering of Nonmedical Exemptions to
School Immunization Requirements and Associations with Geographic Clustering of Pertussis,
168 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1389, 1394-95 (2008); Alexandra Sifferlin, 4 Diseases Making a
Comeback Thanks to Anti-Vaxxers, TIME (Mar. 17, 2014), https://time.com/27308/4-diseases-
making-a-comeback-thanks-to-anti-vaxxers/ [https://perma.cc/3ZJ5-5B4D] (citing nineteen
cases of measles confirmed in New York City despite the fact that it was considered to be
wiped out in 2000, twenty-three cases of mumps at Ohio State University, and eighty cases
of chicken pox in Indiana which were thought to start from an unvaccinated child); Anthony
Zurcher, Measles Outbreak at Disney Raises Vaccination Questions, BBC NEWS (Jan. 22,
2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-echochambers-30942928 [https://perma.cc/V2UG-
DXGF] (reporting that public health experts attribute the spread of the measles outbreak at
Disneyland in 2014 to the lower numbers of Americans who have been opting to receive the
immunization shots).
50. See, e.g., AMA Policy Advocates to Eliminate Non-Medical Vaccine Exemptions, AM.
MED. ASS’N (June 13, 2019), https://www.ama-assn.org/press-center/press-releases/ama-policy-
advocates-eliminate-non-medical-vaccine-exemptions [https://perma.cc/UK8Y-WXSH]; Alyson
Sulaski Wyckoff, Eliminate Nonmedical Immunization Exemptions for School Entry, Says
AAP, AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.aappublications.org/news/
2016/08/29/VaccineExemptions082916 [https://perma.cc/N98N-PP2A].
51. See Hillel Y. Levin, Why Some Religious Accommodations for Mandatory Vaccinations
Violate the Establishment Clause, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 1193, 1234-37 (2017).
52. See de Freytas-Tamura, supra note 7.
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not to vaccinate.53 These private schools have dramatically higher
rates of nonvaccination and undervaccination than do public
schools, making them especially vulnerable to disease outbreaks.54
Many other private schools, however, strongly prefer that parents
comply with state vaccination mandates.55 Their reasons for doing
so may vary—concern over the health of their students, fear of li-
ability, protection of their public image, religious or other values-
based beliefs—but they all face the same question: Does the law
permit them to limit the number of students who are not vaccinated
for nonmedical reasons, or to exclude them altogether?
This Part considers the particular context of private schools, the
legal landscape in which they operate, and the options that state
statutes give them to prevent and minimize the risk of outbreaks of
vaccine-preventable illnesses. It then assesses the possibility that
schools may engage in sincerity inquiries to limit (even if not alto-
gether eliminate) the number of unvaccinated students who attend
their schools.
A. The Private School Context
Any space in which unvaccinated children regularly come into
contact with one another is potentially vulnerable to disease
transmission. Private schools may be especially vulnerable. Private
schools often seek to foster community among their students and
stakeholders. Whether organized around a religious identity, a
particular educational vision, or a set of values, these schools tend
to be smaller and more mission driven than their public school
counterparts.56 Further, small class sizes and extracurricular
bonding experiences among students, faculty, and parents help to
create this sense of community.57
These features may also create an environment in which even a
small number (in absolute terms) of unvaccinated children can lead
53. See id.
54. Shaw et al., supra note 6, at 130, 132.
55. See, e.g., Shea, supra note 8; Urist, supra note 8.
56. See, e.g., School Mission Statements, MISSION STATEMENTS, https://www.mission
statements.com/school_mission_statements.html [https://perma.cc/ELY4-52LX].
57. See Why Choose a Private School?, INLY INSIGHTS (Mar. 29, 2019), https://inly
insights.org/2019/03/29/why-choose-a-private-school/ [https://perma.cc/K2BN-7KKF].
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to a localized outbreak of a deadly disease. Indeed, the recent and
ongoing severe measles outbreak in New York has nearly exclu-
sively affected communities in which parents send their children to
private schools, and it is likely that these private schools have been
sites of contagion.58 Moreover, private schools in many places have
higher rates of vaccination exemptions than public schools, suggest-
ing that they are particularly vulnerable to outbreaks.59 Finally,
many private schools operate programs for children who are too
young to be vaccinated, and who are consequently at particular
risk.60
Professional and lay leaders in private schools have recognized
the potential dangers of nonvaccination and have begun to explore
ways to protect their school communities, including by clarifying
their vaccination policies and adopting new policies to limit or
eliminate the availability of nonmedical exemptions. Some private
schools have gone so far as to require all children to be vaccinated
as a condition of attendance, unless they have a medical exemption,
while others have taken somewhat less drastic measures.61 These
decisions have led to lawsuits in some cases, with inconsistent
outcomes, leaving private schools uncertain as to how to proceed.62
B. The Statutory Landscape for Private Schools
Do state vaccination laws—both the mandates themselves and
the exemptions that states offer—apply to private schools? Further,
if they do apply to private schools, do those laws allow private
schools to selectively accept or reject those claiming nonmedical
exemptions?
Every state has its own statutory scheme compelling vaccination
prior to school attendance. These schemes differ in some important
respects, but they generally share several features. First, they all
58. See Health Department Closes Two Williamsburg Schools for Violating Commissioner’s
Order During Measles Outbreak, NYC HEALTH DEP’T. (June 13, 2019), https://www1.nyc.gov/
site/doh/about/press/pr2019/two-williamsburg-schools-closed-for-measles-violations.page
[https://perma.cc/W9L4-QKNX] (noting that 74 percent of measles cases have occurred within
a small distance from private schools run by the Orthodox Jewish community).
59. Shaw et al., supra note 6, at 130, 132.
60. Id. at 132.
61. See, e.g., supra note 8.
62. See, e.g., supra note 8.
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require students to be vaccinated in order to attend school.63 Second,
all clearly apply these mandates to both public and private schools.64
Third, forty-five states offer nonmedical exemptions from vaccina-
tion mandates for those with objections rooted in religious or
philosophical beliefs.65 Among these states, New Jersey provides
that religious private schools may choose whether or not they will
allow nonmedical exemptions, but it offers no comparable choice to
nonreligious private schools.66
The remaining forty-four states are a bit more complicated. In
several, the statutes provide (or the courts have interpreted or
assumed) that private schools must accept exemptions on the same
terms as do public schools. New York’s previous statutory exemption
scheme (which has recently been amended to eliminate the religious
exemption) offers an illustrative example.67 It dictates that all
children must be vaccinated in order to attend school: “No principal,
teacher, owner or person in charge of a school shall permit any child
to be admitted to such school, or to attend such school [unless the
child has been properly vaccinated].”68 The statute defines “school”
to include private schools: “The term ‘school’ means and includes
63. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
64. State Vaccination Requirements, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://
www.cdc.gov/vaccines/imz-managers/laws/state-reqs.html [https://perma.cc/952N-FN47]
(“State laws establish vaccination requirements for school children. These laws often apply
not only to children attending public schools but also to those attending private schools and
day care facilities.”).
65. A small majority of states limit nonmedical exemptions to those whose religious beliefs
prohibit them from vaccinating their children. NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 38.
The remainder of the states allow for religious or philosophical exemptions. Id. I have argued
elsewhere that the states that limit their exemptions to those with religious objections run
afoul of the Constitution’s Establishment Clause. See Levin, supra note 51, at 1204-06. That
is, states may either allow no exemptions, as in Maine, West Virginia, Mississippi, California,
and New York, or both religious and philosophical exemptions. See id.
66. “Religious affiliated schools or child care centers shall have the authority to withhold
or grant a religious exemption from the required immunization for pupils entering or
attending their institutions without challenge by any secular health authority.” N.J. ADMIN.
CODE § 8:57-4.4(b) (2019). It follows from this special exemption for religious private schools
that nonreligious private schools must accept children with bona fide religious exemptions.
See id.
67. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2164(9) (McKinney 2015). I have chosen to offer New
York’s prior scheme as an example because it is one of the few states in which the availability
of a religious exemption in the statute has been explicitly interpreted by the state court to
apply to private schools. See Bowden v. Iona Grammar Sch., 726 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686 (App. Div.
2001).
68. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2164(7)(a) (McKinney 2019).
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any public, private or parochial child caring center, day nursery, day
care agency, nursery school, kindergarten, elementary, intermediate
or secondary school.”69
As all states’ statutes do, it offers an exemption for children who
cannot be vaccinated for medical reasons: “If any physician licensed
to practice medicine in this state certifies that such immunization
may be detrimental to a child’s health, the requirements of this
section shall be inapplicable until such immunization is found no
longer to be detrimental to the child’s health.”70 Crucially, the
statute then exempts children whose parents object to vaccination
on nonmedical grounds, in this case, for religious reasons: “This
section shall not apply to children whose parent, parents, or guard-
ian hold genuine and sincere religious beliefs which are contrary to
the practices herein required, and no certificate shall be required as
a prerequisite to such children being admitted or received into school
or attending school.”71
There are some open questions about the application of this
statute. For example, is a synagogue or church playgroup that
provides care and education for children during weekly services a
“child caring center” or “day nursery” that must verify compliance
for attendance, or is it more like a weekly babysitting service or
playgroup? However, as is the case with several other states, it
seems clear that children in New York attending private schools are
subject to the same mandates and the same exemptions as are those
attending public school. The phrase that, “no certificate shall be
required as a prerequisite to such children being admitted or
received into school or attending school” is best read to mean that
any school may not require a certificate of immunization if the
student has a legitimate religious exemption.72 Indeed, New York’s
courts interpreted it to mean just that.73 Other states’ courts have
adopted similar interpretations or assumptions.74
69. Id. § 2164(1)(a).
70. Id. § 2164(8).
71. Id. § 2164(9) (emphasis added).
72. See id.
73. See Bowden v. Iona Grammar Sch., 726 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686-87 (App. Div. 2001).
74. Florida courts have assumed that their state’s vaccination laws and exemptions also
apply to private schools. See Flynn v Estevez, 221 So. 3d 1241, 1243, 1249 n.18 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2017) (assuming that, but for church autonomy doctrine, a private school would be bound
to accept a religious exemption); see also Rubinstein v. Temple Isr. Early Learning Ctr., No.
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However, some other states’ laws are less clear as to whether
private schools may reject nonmedical exemptions altogether. Here,
Georgia’s statute is illustrative. Like New York, it imposes vaccina-
tion requirements for students attending both public and private
schools, and it offers a medical exemption.75 And, like New York, it
also offers a nonmedical exemption for those with religious objec-
tions: “This Code section shall not apply to a child whose parent or
legal guardian objects to immunization of the child on the grounds
that the immunization conflicts with the religious beliefs of the
parent or guardian.”76
Unlike New York, though, Georgia’s statute contains no language
that would prohibit private schools from adopting its own rules,
separate and apart from state law, that would impose an obligation
to vaccinate and reject religious exemptions.77 Thus, a good case can
be made that in states with statutes more similar to Georgia’s than
to New York’s, private schools are free to reject nonmedical exemp-
tions.78 However, even in some states where the statutory scheme
more closely resembles Georgia’s than New York’s, the courts have
intimated that the statutes require private schools to accept
exemption claims on the same basis as do public schools.79 And, in
most states, the courts have not yet confronted the question.
All told, then, the statutory landscape for private schools is as
follows:
• In the five states that reject all nonmedical exemptions, statutes
do not distinguish between public and private schools.80 Thus, all
schools must impose vaccination requirements, and none may
offer nonmedical exemptions.
335101, 2018 WL 1020509, at *1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2018) (assuming the same in
Michigan).
75. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-2-771(a)(2),(a)(4), (d) (2019); see also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§
2164(1)(a), (7).
76. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-771 (e); see N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2164(9).
77. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-771(a)(4), with N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 2164(1)(a).
78. See infra Part IV.B.
79. See supra note 8.
80. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120325 (Deering 2016); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-23-
37 (1983); W. VA. CODE § 16-3-4 (2015).
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• In New Jersey, religious private schools may choose to reject all
nonmedical exemptions if they so choose, but nonreligious private
schools do not have this option.81
• In the remaining forty-four states, some statutory schemes re-
quire private schools to accept nonmedical exemptions on the
same terms as must public schools, while others seem to allow
private schools to adopt their own policies, although no courts
have explicitly adopted this interpretation.82
In at least some states, then, private schools that wish to exclude
nonvaccinated students do not have the statutory authority to do so.
Do they have other options for reducing the risk of vaccine-prevent-
able illnesses?
C. The Possibility (and Limits) of Engaging in Sincerity Inquiries
The forty-five states that allow for nonmedical exemptions offer
only limited bases for claiming them. Most of these allow them
solely on the basis of religious belief, while others also allow them
on the basis of what are typically called philosophical, personal
belief, or conscientious objections.83 It follows, then, that other bases
for nonvaccination that often motivate people to reject vaccina-
tions—inconvenience,84 conspiracy theories,85 or misguided fears
about purported dangers of vaccines86—are not acceptable bases for
nonvaccination in any state. Consequently, like claims for religious
exemptions in other contexts, the claimant for a nonmedical
81. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
82. See NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 38.
83. Id.
84. Michael Favin et al., Why Children Are Not Vaccinated: A Review of the Grey
Literature, 4 INT’L HEALTH 229, 232 (2012), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/S1876341312000496 [https://perma.cc/F58Q-6JBX].
85. Michael Davidson, Vaccination as a Cause of Autism—Myths and Controversies, 19
DIALOGUES IN CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 403, 403-06 (2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC5789217/ [https://perma.cc/55CN-2UQY]; Robert M. Wolfe & Lisa K. Sharp,
Anti-Vaccinationists Past and Present, 325 BMJ 430, 431-32 (2002), https://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1123944/ [https://perma.cc/P53V-6MJ8].
86. Sarah E. Williams, What Are the Factors that Contribute to Vaccine-Hesitancy and
What Can We Do About It?, 10 HUM. VACCINES & IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS 2584, 2584 (2014),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.4161/hv.28596 [https://perma.cc/JT94-B969].
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exemption must be sincerely motivated by religious or (in some
states) philosophical beliefs.87
This begs a question: How, if at all, may school officials distin-
guish between those with “legitimate” bases for nonvaccination from
those with “illegitimate” bases for nonvaccination? May private
schools in those states that statutorily require schools to accept
nonmedical exemptions conduct sincerity inquiries of those claiming
nonmedical exemptions to determine whether the claim is legiti-
mate? May they use these inquiries as a means of limiting, even if
not eliminating, the number of students who are unvaccinated in
their schools? The following Sections address these questions.
1. What Is a Sincerity Inquiry?
“Courts and government officials adjudicate religious sincerity in
a wide variety of contexts: fraud; immigration; employment
discrimination; prisoner religious accommodations; conscientious
objection from service in the armed forces; and statutory accommo-
dations from general laws.”88 However, the prevailing wisdom
among scholars and some judges is that such inquiries are difficult,
problematic, dangerous, and possibly unconstitutional.89
The claims that religious sincerity inquiries are impossible or
may be unconstitutional are mistaken. People who lie about their
religious or philosophical commitments in order to receive special
accommodations are not entitled to those accommodations, and
courts and other decision makers often must have a means of
assessing credibility to separate the legitimate claims from the
pretextual.90 Government officials, judges, juries, and others must
routinely make judgments about honesty, credibility, and sincerity;
and judging religious sincerity is, for the most part, a similar
endeavor.91 That is, it is neither impossible nor unconstitutional.
That said, it is true that, for reasons unique to the context of
87. Nathan S. Chapman, Adjudicating Religious Sincerity, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1185, 1187
(2017).
88. Id. at 1188 (footnotes omitted).
89. Id. at 1188-90.
90. See generally id.
91. Id. at 1228-29.
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religious claims, sincerity inquiries are especially difficult and
fraught.
Sincerity inquiries are perhaps best known from the context of
conscientious objection to compulsory military service, and that
context offers a useful lens for understanding how sincerity
inquiries work—and why they are hard.92 From its earliest days as
a nation, the United States has recognized a statutory exemption
from conscription for those whose religious beliefs prohibit them
from serving in the military.93 The contours of this right have
changed—indeed, expanded—over time to include people with
certain nonreligious beliefs that parallel religious beliefs.94 Yet the
right is still limited. Just as in the case of vaccination mandates,
one must have a sincere religious (or quasi-religious or conscien-
tious) objection to military service in order to be eligible for the
exemption.95 This requires a sorting mechanism—the sincerity
inquiry—to determine whether a given exemption claim is legiti-
mate.
During and around the period of the Vietnam War, the Selective
Service System routinely assessed the sincerity of those who applied
for conscientious objector status. Adjudicators would probe claim-
ants as to the nature and source of their beliefs, search for inconsis-
tencies, and scrutinize their demeanors for evidence of dishonesty.96
And, in many cases, the adjudicators would reject the claims, and
imprisonment or conscription would follow.97 What other choice did
92. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970) (interpreting the term “religious”
in the conscientious objector statute to include beliefs that are sincerely held, and which
occupy in the life of the objector a place parallel to that filled by a higher being); Witmer v.
United States, 348 U.S. 375, 384 (1955) (upholding the rejection of a Jehovah’s Witness’s
conscientious objector claim for lack of sincerity).
93. Ellis M. West, The Right to Religion-Based Exemptions in Early America: The Case
of Conscientious Objectors to Conscription, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 367, 374 (1993).
94. See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 339-40 (holding that a conscientious objector need not base his
deeply held and sincere beliefs against participating in the war in a recognized religion to
qualify under the conscientious objector exemption; rather, “[w]hat is necessary ... for a
registrant’s conscientious objection to all war to be ‘religious’ within the meaning of [the
statute] is that this opposition to war stem from the registrant’s moral, ethical, or religious
beliefs about what is right and wrong and that these beliefs be held with the strength of
traditional religious convictions.”).
95. Id.
96. See supra note 94.
97. James B. White, Processing Conscientious Objector Claims: A Constitutional Inquiry,
56 CALIF. L. REV. 652, 658-59 (1968).
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the adjudicators have? If such inquiries were impossible or unconsti-
tutional, then anyone who preferred not to be drafted could claim
conscientious objector status.
Over time, however, as a result of both social changes and
doctrinal developments, sincerity inquiries of this sort have become
more difficult, with many commentators and judges preferring to
avoid them altogether. First, throughout contemporary American
society, religious beliefs and practices have become less communal
and shared, and more personal and idiosyncratic.98 This is borne out
by public polling, which reveals a decline in institutionalized
religious affiliation and the growth of individualized spiritual beliefs
and practices.99 Such idiosyncratic beliefs are entitled to the same
constitutional protections as religious beliefs associated with
organized religions.100 But the absence of any religious reference
point—a text, a church, a corpus of commonly held beliefs, a reli-
gious leader—makes a sincerity inquiry difficult, simply as a
practical matter. How does one test the sincerity of a person’s
claimed idiosyncratic beliefs?
Second, the courts have made it clear that sincerity inquiries
must be narrow, going only to the question of whether a claimant for
a religious exemption honestly believes that her religious beliefs
prohibit her from engaging in certain behavior.101 In doing so,
decision makers may not infer insincerity of a religious belief from
its implausibility.102 This limitation strips adjudicators of one cru-
cial tool they would use in other contexts requiring a judgment as
to a witness’s honesty, and thus makes the endeavor more difficult.
For example, the testimony of a witness to a car accident who
claims that she saw the accident while walking on water can
reasonably be dismissed, discounted, or doubted as the product of a
lie or a delusion. But someone seeking a religious accommodation
who states that his belief arises from being visited by an angel who
walked across water to reach him cannot be dismissed as lying or
98. See Courtney Miller, “Spiritual But Not Religious”: Rethinking the Legal Definition
of Religion, 102 VA. L. REV. 833, 834-35 (2016).
99. U.S. Public Becoming Less Religious, PEW RES. CTR., (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.pew
forum.org/2015/11/03/u-s-public-becoming-less-religious [https://perma.cc/ BAN9-7HZC].
100. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 339-40.
101. See Chapman, supra note 87, at 1225-26.
102. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 (1944); Chapman, supra note 87, at 1225-
26.
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delusional. Indeed, even if he is delusional, the only question is
whether he believes his delusion to be true. In such a case, it is diffi-
cult to see how to engage in a meaningful sincerity inquiry. For
these reasons, although sincerity inquiries are sometimes unavoid-
able,103 they are not easy.
2. Should Private Schools Engage in Sincerity Inquiries?
Engaging in sincerity inquiries may seem like an attractive option
for private schools seeking to reduce the number of students who
are not vaccinated. Many who claim religious or philosophical
exemptions will privately state that their objections to vaccination
are not truly rooted in religion or philosophy at all, but rather in
their (mistaken) scientific beliefs about the safety and efficacy of
vaccinations.104 Further, there are vanishingly few organized,
hierarchical, or institutionalized religious groups that oppose
vaccination on religious grounds, and those that exist have scant
representation in this country.105 This has led many commentators
to argue that virtually all religious exemption claims are insincere
and should be rejected outright or at least heavily scrutinized.106
Consequently, a private school might reasonably consider
requiring parents to explain their reasons for not vaccinating prior
to granting an exemption. Those parents who either assert that
their reasons are rooted in (mistaken) scientific beliefs or whom the
conductor of the inquiry believes to be lying can then be denied the
exemption, while those of parents who credibly claim religious or
103. Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 753,
755 n.7 (1984).
104. See Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Thou Shalt Not Take the Name of the Lord Thy God in
Vain: Use and Abuse of Religious Exemptions from School Immunization Requirements, 65
HASTINGS L.J. 1551, 1570-71; 1584-85 (2014); Parents Claim Religion to Avoid Vaccines for
Kids, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 17, 2007, 4:24 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/
21347434/ns/health-childrens_health/t/parents-claim-religion-avoid-vaccines-kids/
[https://perma.cc/V5HY-LZA2].
105. John D. Grabenstein, What the World’s Religions Teach, Applied to Vaccines and
Immune Globulins, 31 VACCINE 2011, 2012 (2013), http://childrenshealthcare.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/Vaccine-Grabenstein-article.pdf [https://perma.cc/3D4R-FVFJ];
Immunizations and Religion, VAND. U. MED. CTR. (Aug. 27, 2013), https://www.vumc.org/
health-wellness/news-resource-articles/immunizations-and-religion [https://perma.cc/ZAZ7-
LCGP].
106. Levin, supra note 51, at 1207; Reiss, supra note 104, at 1584-85.
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(where applicable) conscientious objections would be accepted.
Although this would not effectively exclude all of those who are non-
vaccinated for nonmedical reasons from a given school, it might
reduce their number and thereby lower the risk of contagion by
eliminating some vectors of disease transmission.
This approach is not a panacea, however. First, some states cate-
gorically prohibit sincerity inquiries for vaccination exemptions.107
These states require schools to accept at face value anyone’s verbal
or written claim that the exemption is rooted in religious or
philosophical beliefs.108 In these states, sincerity inquiries are
simply not an option.
Second, even where sincerity inquiries are theoretically permit-
ted, there are several reasons to proceed with caution. As a practical
matter, for the reasons previously discussed, such inquiries are
difficult to conduct. One imagines that savvy parents would quickly
learn to couch their objections in religious or philosophical terms
when questioned by school administrators. Indeed, the evidence
suggests that parents who prefer not to vaccinate are adept at
modifying their claimed reasons when state laws change to foreclose
previously available justifications for their choices.109 Once they do
so, how could a school administrator deny the claim? As the cases
demonstrate, denying such claims invites expensive legal challenges
and exposes the school to potential liability.110 Thus, sincerity
inquiries may be ineffective and too risky and expensive for private
schools to engage in.
There are also potential philosophical and constitutional reasons
to decline to engage in such inquiries. Although many non-
vaccinators may privately state that their reasons are not rooted in
religious or philosophical objections, scholars have argued that their
107. Anne L. Knight, Religious Exemptions to North Carolina’s Childhood Immunization
Requirements, U.N.C. SCH. GOV. L. BULL. 15-16 (Fall 2004), https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/
www.sog.unc.edu/files/reports/article2_5.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XHJ-T433].
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Paul L. Delamater et al., Elimination of Nonmedical Immunization
Exemptions in California and School-Entry Vaccine Status, PEDIATRICS, June 2019, at 1, 5-8.
110. Case Law on Religious Exemptions to Vaccination Requirements, NETWORK FOR PUB.
HEALTH L. (Feb. 28, 2019, 9:20 AM), https://www.networkforphl.org/resources_collection/
2019/02/28/1115/case_law_on_religious_exemptions_to_vaccination_requirements
[https://perma.cc/MA9V-LMDR].
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objections are nevertheless legitimate.111 For example, Navin and
others argue that many parents’ objections are rooted in an “ethics
of purity” that encompasses both physical and spiritual purity, and
that informs their life choices well beyond the vaccination context.112
These ethics of purity are similar in kind to—and may draw on—
religious, spiritual, and transcendental beliefs. Indeed, many of the
choices that people make as a result of holding these kinds of beliefs
are similar in kind to the religiously motivated choices made by
those with traditional deistic beliefs. Both groups may engage in
particularistic behaviors related to diet, child-rearing, schooling,
communal association, lifestyle, and personal identity. Thus, even
if objections to vaccination are not religious in the deistic or familiar
sense, they share important characteristics of classical religious
beliefs and perhaps should be understood or treated by the law as
religious.113
Whatever one thinks of this argument as a theoretical matter, it
finds support in Supreme Court precedent. In the Vietnam era
conscientious objector case, Welsh v. United States, the Court held
that a statute that only exempted religious objectors from forced
conscription also applied to “those whose consciences, spurred by
deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no
rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of an
instrument of war.”114 In fact, the Court affirmed that anyone whose
objection occupied the same place in his life as did those whose
objections were rooted in traditional beliefs was entitled to the
religious exemption.115 Although courts have been reticent to further
develop this approach to religious accommodation, any private
school that denies a nonmedical vaccination exemption to parents
whose beliefs are credibly rooted in an “ethic of purity” must be
aware that it potentially exposes itself to a costly lawsuit with little
assurance of success.
111. See NAVIN, supra note 19, at 97-98; Levin, supra note 106, at 1207-08.
112. NAVIN, supra note 19, at 97-99, 104-06, 110-12, 121-22; Mark Navin, Prioritizing
Religion in Vaccine Exemption Policies (Apr. 17, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://
www.bgsu.edu/content/dam/BGSU/college-of-arts-and-sciences/philosophy/documents/
conferences/2015%20Religious%20Exemptions/Navin.pdf [https://perma.cc/SV76-9W97].
113. Levin, supra note 51, at 1207 (footnotes omitted).
114. 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970).
115. Id. at 339.
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All of this is to say that private schools in some states may choose
to engage in sincerity inquiries, but doing so is hardly a panacea.
III. BEYOND STATUTES: CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVATE
SCHOOLS’ VACCINATION POLICIES
If some states’ statutes require private schools to accept
nonmedical exemptions, and if constitutional barriers prohibit or
limit the utility of sincerity inquiries, do private schools have other
means to protect their students from vaccine-preventable illnesses?
This Part explores three possible constitutional arguments that
private schools may assert to support their exclusion of students
who are not vaccinated for nonmedical reasons: (1) that religious ex-
emptions to vaccination mandates themselves violate the Establish-
ment Clause; (2) that constitutional religious autonomy doctrines
give religious private schools an independent right to reject vacci-
nation exemptions; and (3) that the freedom of association rooted in
the First Amendment’s free speech doctrine provides a similar right
to exclude for some or all private schools.
A. Challenging the Constitutionality of (Some) Vaccination
Exemptions
As described previously, the majority of states that allow non-
medical exemptions only permit them for religious reasons, and not
for philosophical or other “personal belief” exemptions. As I have
argued in depth elsewhere, this presents serious constitutional
problems.116
The Establishment Clause restricts the degree to which the
government may accommodate only religious interests when those
accommodations would impose costs and burdens on third parties.117
The risks that nonvaccination impose on third parties—those who
must rely on community immunity—constitute such a burden.118
Consequently, when state legislatures allow for only religious
116. See Levin, supra note 51, at 1193-241 (arguing that state laws offering only religious
exemptions that impose burdens on third parties are unconstitutional if they do not offer
comparable nonreligious exceptions).
117. Id. at 1214.
118. Id. at 1198-200, 1209.
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exemptions to vaccination mandates, and not parallel nontheistic
conscience-based exemptions, they violate the Establishment
Clause.119
In theory, a private school located in a state that, (1) offers only
religious exemptions, and (2) statutorily requires private schools to
accept religious exemptions, could make use of this constitutional
argument. After all, if the statutory exemption itself is unconstitu-
tional, then parties cannot hold a private school liable for rejecting
such exemptions. To reject vaccinations on this basis, a private
school would first issue a policy excluding students with religious
exemptions, and then, when a party challenges that policy in court,
deploy this anti-Establishment-based constitutional argument as a
defense.
But this approach is not without its own limitations and risks.
Most obviously, a school adopting this approach assumes the normal
costs and risks associated with litigation. Further, although I am
quite fond of this argument—having developed it myself—I do not
have the hubris necessary to assert with confidence that a court will
adopt it. (It certainly would not be the first time that a court re-
jected an academic’s argument.)
Most troublingly, even if a court did recognize the constitutional
problem raised when states only offer religious exemptions, it is
possible that its remedy would be to expand the exemption to
include those who claim philosophical objections to vaccination
rather than to strike down the religious exemption as unconstitu-
tional. Indeed, there would be precedent for doing so. Consider
again the statute that allowed for conscientious objection at the time
of the Vietnam War. It explicitly offered the exemption only to those
whose objections were rooted in “religious training and belief.”120
The statute defined this term as “belief in a relation to a Supreme
Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human
relation,” and not including “essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views or a merely personal code.”121
119. See id. at 1214-17 (analyzing how the Supreme Court has used the “no third party
harms” principle to strike down religious accommodations that burden nonreligious third
parties).
120. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 336.
121. Id. at 336 (quoting Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. § 456(j)
(1958)).
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In grappling with the potential constitutional flaw in this statute,
the Supreme Court, in the Seeger and Welsh cases, adopted a broad
interpretation (if it can really be called an interpretation at all) of
“religious training and belief.” Specifically, it held that this phrase
must be read to include any “sincere and meaningful belief which
occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by
the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption.”122 In
other words, the Court held that at least some objections to war
that are rooted in ethical or philosophical concerns—rather than
in those that would traditionally be considered “religious”—would
entitle their possessors to conscientious objector status.123 This is
the same constitutional flaw that is present in state statutes that
limit vaccination exemptions to those rooted in religious belief.
Consequently, if faced with a similarly problematic statute in the
vaccination context, it is possible that a court would make the same
interpretive leap in order to save the statutory exemption from
unconstitutionality.
And, although courts have not dealt with this precise question in
the vaccination context, some state courts have considered a similar
issue and adopted an expansionist interpretation.124 Some state
vaccination statutes have said that only those who are members of
“recognized religions” are entitled to an exemption.125 Such a
provision is blatantly unconstitutional, for it privileges some kinds
122. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165, 176 (1965) (“[T]he test of belief ‘in a
relation to a Supreme Being’ is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies
a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one
who clearly qualifies for the exemption.”); see Welsh, 398 U.S. at 339 (citing Seeger, 380 U.S.
at 176).
123. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165-66, 176.
124. See Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938 (E.D. Ark. 2002); McCarthy v. Boozman,
212 F. Supp. 2d 945 (W.D. Ark. 2002); Sherr v. Northport-E. Northport Union Free Sch. Dist.,
672 F. Supp. 81 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Dalli v. Bd. of Educ., 267 N.E.2d 219 (Mass. 1971).
125. For example, Iowa’s child immunization statute requires an affidavit “stating that the
immunization conflicts with the tenets and practices of a recognized religious denomination
of which the applicant is an adherent or member” for nonmedical exemptions. IOWA CODE
§ 139A.8(2) (emphasis added). Proposed changes would eliminate the requirement of a
“recognized” religious denomination. See S. 239, 88th Leg. (Iowa 2019). The Iowa Admin-
istrative Code defines a valid certificate of immunization exemption for religious reasons as
requiring an attestation “that immunization conflicts with a genuine and sincere religious
belief and that the belief is in fact religious and not based merely on philosophical, scientific,
moral, personal, or medical opposition to immunizations.” IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 641-
7.3(2)(139A) (2018) (emphasis added).
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of religious beliefs over others, thereby violating the Establishment
Clause.126 However, rather than striking down such statutes as
unconstitutional, most courts have instead effectively adopted the
Seeger/Welsh approach and simply expanded the exemption to apply
to anyone opposed to vaccination for religious reasons, regardless of
their affiliation with “recognized religions.”127
I have explained elsewhere why I believe that this would be the
wrong way to resolve a challenge to a state with an unconstitutional
religious-only exemption, with the correct remedy (for both doctrinal
and prudential reasons) being to strike down the exemption.128
However, I am not entirely confident that every court confronting
this issue would see it my way. Any private school considering using
this as a basis to reject exemptions altogether would need to con-
sider the risk that, in defending its policy to reject religious
exemptions, a court may perversely expand the state’s exemption
scheme.
Finally, even at its best—that is, even if a court agreed that the
exemption is unconstitutional as written and that the proper
remedy is to strike it down—this approach is still limited in its
utility for private schools. After all, it is possible, even if unlikely in
the current political climate, that a state legislature would respond
to such a ruling by reenacting a broader exemption scheme that
applies to both religious and philosophical objectors, thus fixing the
constitutional flaw.129 While that might reflect a healthy dialogue
126. See Levin, supra note 51, at 1204-05.
127. See Boone, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 946 (finding the provision of a statute which limited
religious exemptions to practices of a “recognized church or religious denomination” was
unconstitutional); McCarthy, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 948-50 (striking down as unconstitutional a
statute that only provided exemptions for “members or adherents of a church or religious
denomination recognized by the State”); Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 91 (finding unconstitutional
the provision of a statute which limited religious exemptions to “bona fide members of a
recognized religious organization”); Dalli, 267 N.E.2d at 222-23 (finding a statute un-
constitutional because it limited religious exemptions to adherents and members “of a
recognized church or religious denomination”).
128. Levin, supra note 51, at 1228-29 (arguing that, when a court finds a statute
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause, the appropriate remedy is to strike down
the religious accommodation, rather than expanding it to include nonreligious philosophical
beliefs).
129. States Move to Eliminate Non-Medical Exemptions for Vaccinations, ASS’N ST. &
TERRITORIAL HEALTH OFFICIALS (Feb. 21, 2019, 12:44 PM), https://www.astho.org/State
PublicHealth/States-Move-to-Eliminate-Non-Medical-Exemptions-for-Vaccinations/02-21-19/
[https://perma.cc/E2LS-XV2D]. But see Molly Harbarger, Hundreds Pack Oregon Hearing to
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between courts and legislatures, and while statutes that are
constitutional are preferable to those that are unconstitutional, it
would only serve to return the private school to its original position;
only this time, it would be required to accept religious or philosophi-
cal objections.
In any event, this entire approach would only help private schools
in those states that limit their vaccination exemptions to those
claiming religious exemptions. In states that also allow for philo-
sophical or similar nonreligious exemptions, there is no question
that such exemptions are constitutionally permissible.
B. Religious Freedom: Church Autonomy
Religious private schools have a second argument rooted in the
Religion Clauses that would support their right to reject vaccination
exemptions: church autonomy. State and federal courts have un-
animously recognized that the freedoms guaranteed by the Religion
Clauses create a sphere of autonomy for religious organizations.130
Broadly speaking, this means that some state laws simply cannot
apply to religious organizations.131 The clearest statement of this
right comes from the Supreme Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.132 There, the Court recognized the min-
isterial exception to state antidiscrimination law, a particular
subspecies of the broader category of church autonomy.133 But
church autonomy extends beyond the ministerial exception.
Oppose Bill to End Vaccine Exemptions, OREGONIAN (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.oregonlive.
com/education/2019/03/hundreds-pack-oregon-hearing-to-oppose-vaccination-bill.html
[https://perma.cc/93D5-FTKV].
130. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 199-
200 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“To safeguard this crucial autonomy [of religious groups],
we have long recognized that the Religion Clauses protect a private sphere within which
religious bodies are free to govern themselves in accordance with their own beliefs. The
Constitution guarantees religious bodies ‘independence from secular control or manip-
ulation—in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of
church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Kedroff
v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952))).
131. See id. at 186-87 (analyzing Supreme Court precedent striking down state laws that
infringe on religious organizations’ sovereignty).
132. See id. at 188-89.
133. Chapman, supra note 87, at 1197.
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In this Section, I first review the Hosanna-Tabor decision to
explain how the ministerial exception represents an exception to the
much more limited religious freedoms typically guaranteed by the
First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. I then dig more deeply
into the broader but underdeveloped church autonomy doctrine and
demonstrate that the courts have tried to demarcate a sphere of
“internal” church matters in which state law does not apply, as
distinguished from “external” matters, to which state law does
apply. Finally, I show that constitutionally protected church auton-
omy allows at least some, and possibly all, religious private schools
to exclude from admission any students who are not vaccinated for
nonmedical reasons.
1. Hosanna-Tabor: The Ministerial Exception
In general, the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause does not
allow religious individuals or groups to ignore state law due to their
religious beliefs.134 Under Employment Division v. Smith, any law
that is generally applicable and neutral toward religion is presump-
tively valid, even when it imposes a burden on religious practice.135
Thus, for example, a law that requires people to pay taxes is valid
even if that law conflicts with an individual’s sincere religious belief
that the form of taxation is prohibited by God.136 Smith interprets
the Free Exercise Clause to protect only the freedom of religious
belief and worship, rather than religious practice, from incursion by
the state.137
Although Smith’s rule is not especially generous to religious
adherents, courts, agencies, and legislatures have provided some
broader protections to religious practices and organizations. First,
as the Supreme Court has made clear, laws that are not generally
applicable or neutral toward religion—that is, laws that target
134. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879-80 (1990) (“[T]he
right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid
and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes ... conduct that
his religion prescribes.’” (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens,
J., concurring in judgment))).
135. Id.
136. Lee, 455 U.S. at 261.
137. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79.
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religious practices—are presumptively invalid.138 In other words, it
is unconstitutional for a state actor to discriminate against religious
practices, explicitly or implicitly; and it may even be unconstitu-
tional to offer some nonreligious exemptions to an otherwise neutral
and generally applicable law without also offering parallel religious
exemptions.139
Second, Smith suggests that laws that burden what the Courts
call hybrid rights—where both freedom of religion and another con-
stitutionally protected interest, such as parental rights or speech
rights, are implicated—are subject to strict scrutiny.140 Candidly,
courts have not embraced this caveat to Smith’s general rule,141 and
it does not appear that the Supreme Court has much interest in
breathing life into this concept.142 It is also not clear that the idea
itself makes any sense. As though through some alchemy, two
weakly protected constitutional values—say, religious freedom and
parental freedom—earn more constitutional protection when
138. See id. at 879; see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 531-32 (1993).
139. James M. Oleske, Jr., Lukumi at Twenty: A Legacy of Uncertainty for Religious Liberty
and Animal Welfare Laws, 19 ANIMAL L. REV. 295, 299, 306-14, 322-34 (2013) (discussing the
selective-exemption rule—“the idea ... that although the Free Exercise Clause does not require
religious exemptions to be made from uniform legal obligations, religious exemptions will
occasionally be required when the government makes available other exemptions to a law
(citing the Supreme Court’s opinion in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 559)).
140. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82.
141. See Ryan S. Rummage, In Combination: Using Hybrid Rights to Expand Religious
Liberty, 64 EMORY L.J. 1175, 1189-96 (2015) for a review of courts’ decisions regarding the
hybrid approach: the 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Circuits view the “hybrid” language from Smith as
dicta, and have declined to follow it as precedential law. Combs v. Homer-Center Sch. Dist.,
540 F.3d 231, 244 (3d Cir. 2008); Knight v. Connecticut Dept. of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156,
160 (2d Cir. 2001); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. Of the Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 1993).
The 1st Circuit and District of Columbia Circuits have taken the view that a hybrid rights
free exercise claim can only be successful if the other constitutional claim involved could be
successful alone. Gary S. v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2004). The 9th and
10th Circuits have considered such claims, and have determined that a free exercise hybrid
claim does not require the use of the compelling interest test whenever a companion
constitutional claim is also raised—rather, the companion claim must at least have a
“probability or likelihood, but not a certitude, of success on the merits.” Axson-Flynn v.
Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1296-1297 (10th Cir. 2004); Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights
Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 705 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated en banc on ripeness grounds, 220 F.3d
1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
142. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 559, 567 (Souter, J., concurring)
(describing Smith’s hybrid approach “as ultimately untenable”).
2020] PRIVATE SCHOOLS’ ROLE AND RIGHTS 1639
combined than either would alone.143 Nevertheless, there is at least
the possibility that courts will expand religious freedom over time
by engaging the hybrid-rights approach that Smith offers.
Finally, some states have imposed higher constitutional and stat-
utory safeguards for religious practices.144 Likewise, under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act145 and the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act,146 as well as in numerous other
statutes and regulations,147 the federal government has also im-
posed strict scrutiny on certain laws that burden religious practice,
even when they are neutral and generally applicable.148
Now let us consider how the Smith approach, with its refine-
ments, exceptions, and expansions, would apply to a church that
wishes to defy a state’s general antidiscrimination law by hiring
only men as ministers. Under Smith, the church would seem to be
out of luck, even where it is sincerely motivated by religious belief.
Laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex are neutral
and generally applicable, and so this law ought to be presumptively
valid. Further, even if strict scrutiny were to apply, either because
the state protects religious practice to a greater degree than does
Smith or because hybrid rights are implicated, the courts have often
held that antidiscrimination laws pass strict scrutiny.149 Conse-
quently, under the standard doctrinal approach to religious free
exercise, the state’s prohibition on sex discrimination would trump
the church’s religious doctrines.
143. See Gregory P. Magarian, How to Apply the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to
Federal Law Without Violating the Constitution, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1903, 1908 n.21 (2001).
144. Gary S. Gildin, Coda to William Penn’s Overture: Safeguarding Non-Mainstream
Religious Liberty Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 81, 82-83 (2001);
Hillel Y. Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities’ Political Power, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1617,
1646 (2015).
145. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2, 107 Stat. 1488,
1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994)) (later ruled unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)).
146. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 106-274,
§§ 2-3, 114 Stat. 803, 803-804 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-1 (2012)).
147. Levin, supra note 144, at 1648-50.
148. See id.
149. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict
Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2420-21 (1996).
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In the wake of Smith, variations on this case bubbled up through
the lower courts.150 Despite Smith, these courts (along with a long
line of earlier decisions) unanimously held that antidiscrimination
laws cannot limit a religious organization’s decision concerning
whom to hire as a minister.151 They arrived at this conclusion in
different ways, but they agreed on a central point: there is a
ministerial exception to antidiscrimination law.152
The Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor affirmed this exception
and took a relatively expansive view of its reach. In Hosanna-Tabor,
a disabled teacher at a religious school and the EEOC sued the
school for retaliatory dismissal after the teacher threatened to take
legal action to protect her rights under the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act.153 The Court unanimously sustained the ministerial ex-
ception, holding that the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause “bar the government from interfering with the
decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.”154 That is,
even if she was fired due to her disability, or in retaliation for taking
legal action, the church was free to do so.
The Court’s conception of the ministerial exception was notably
broad in one particular sense. Some lower courts had held that the
ministerial exception to antidiscrimination law only applied when
a church’s reasons for refusing to hire or firing a minister were
150. See Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2008); Hollins v.
Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225-27 (6th Cir. 2007); Petruska v. Gannon Univ.,
462 F.3d 294, 303-07 (3d Cir. 2006); Werft v. Desert Sw. Ann. Conference of the United
Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099, 1100-04 (9th Cir. 2004); Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the
Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 655-57 (10th Cir. 2002); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of
Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 800-01 (4th Cir. 2000); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal
Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1301-04 (11th Cir. 2000); Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual
Conference, 173 F.3d 343, 345-50 (5th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455,
460 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
151. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188
(2012) (“The Courts of Appeals, in contrast, have had extensive experience with this issue.
Since the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... and other employment
discrimination laws, the Courts of Appeals have uniformly recognized the existence of a
‘ministerial exception,’ grounded in the First Amendment, that precludes application of such
legislation to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious institution
and its ministers.” (citation omitted)).
152. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188.
153. Id. at 179-80.
154. Id. at 181.
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rooted in religious belief and doctrine.155 The Supreme Court
rejected this approach, holding instead that the state may never
interfere with a church’s decisions concerning ministerial employ-
ment, regardless of the church’s reasons.156
To be sure, the Hosanna-Tabor decision leaves some important
questions unanswered. For one, the Court did not offer a definitive
test for determining who within a religious organization counts as
a minister, but only implied that a kind of “totality of the cir-
cumstances” test applies.157 Likewise, it did not offer guidance as
to what other decisions a church might make that would be insu-
lated from interference by the state.158 These issues have been ex-
tensively litigated in the lower courts, with different courts taking
divergent views.159
However—and this is the important part—it is clear from
Hosanna-Tabor that there is a sphere of religious organizational
governance into which secular law may not intrude, and this sphere
of autonomy extends beyond the ministerial exception.
2. Beyond the Ministerial Exception: Church Autonomy Under
the First Amendment and Schools’ Vaccination Policies
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court approvingly cited and embraced a
series of older cases that implicated related, but not identical, issues
of religious organizations’ special rights. For example, the Court
cited Watson v. Jones, which involved a dispute between antislavery
and proslavery factions of a church over who controlled the church’s
property.160 There, the Court declined to decide the case on its
merits, holding instead that, “whenever the questions of discipline,
or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided
by the highest of [the] church judicatories to which the matter has
been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final,
and as binding on them.”161 This and the other cases cited by the
155. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 801.
156. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196.
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. See Volokh, supra note 149.
160. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 186 (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679
(1872)).
161. Id. at 185-86 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Watson, 80
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Court, together with a wealth of state and lower federal court
opinions, indicate that there is a broader category of freedoms guar-
anteed to religious organizations, of which the ministerial exception
is but one constituent part.
As the Court noted in Hosanna-Tabor, quoting an earlier decision,
the cases suggest “a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an
independence from secular control or manipulation—in short, power
to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of
church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”162
Although the reach and contours of this broader church autonomy
concept are unclear, the previous quote from Hosanna-Tabor reflects
a pattern in its application in the lower courts: “internal” church
matters—disposition of church property, management and gover-
nance, questions of religious doctrine, resolving intrachurch dis-
putes—are not subject to state oversight and authority. On the
other hand, “external” matters—those that bring the church into
conflict with the broader society—are subject to Smith’s general
rule.163
Some of the contemporary church-state conflicts that prove most
vexing for courts involve disputes that lie in the vague, liminal, and
gray spaces at the intersection of (or border between) “internal” and
“external.” For example, if a church rents out its facilities for
weddings in a state in which antidiscrimination law extends to
sexual orientation discrimination, may it decline to rent to a same-
sex couple on religious grounds?164
However, some kinds of cases are not difficult because they are
clearly either “internal” or “external” matters. “External” issues,
over which neutral and generally applicable state law trumps reli-
gious doctrines, include things such as taxation and zoning laws, as
well as those laws that pertain to individuals’ behavior (other than
prayer) outside of the walls of the church.165 Meanwhile, the three
most well-known and most often litigated expressions of the church
U.S. at 727).
162. Id. at 186 (quoting Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church
in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)).
163. See id. at 190.
164. See, e.g., Egan v. Hamline Methodist Church, 679 N.W.2d 350 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
165. See Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1406
(1981).
2020] PRIVATE SCHOOLS’ ROLE AND RIGHTS 1643
autonomy doctrine—the clearly “internal” matters—are the minis-
terial exception (and variations on it),166 disputes involving church
property,167 and a grab bag of other cases that implicate disputes
over religious doctrine.168
A fourth area of church autonomy, which is apparently rarely
litigated because the law is perfectly clear, involves the selection of
church membership. These decisions lie in the very heartland of
“internal” church matters. For example, suppose that an Orthodox
Jewish synagogue admitted only Jewish members. Suppose further
that, pursuant to Orthodox religious law, the synagogue only
considered those with Jewish mothers, or those who converted to
Judaism under the supervision of Orthodox rabbinic authorities, to
be Jewish. Plainly, notwithstanding state and federal antidis-
crimination laws that typically prohibit discrimination on the basis
of religion,169 these choices are not subject to state interference.170
Put simply, a church gets to decide who is eligible to be a member
of the church.171
This has critical implications for the potential right of religious
private schools to exclude unvaccinated students. When a reli-
giously affiliated school determines its student admissions criteria,
it is no different from a synagogue determining its membership
criteria. Indeed, recall that Hosanna-Tabor involved a teacher in a
religious school, and not, say, a preacher in a church.172 Thus, for
example, a Catholic school may decline to accept students who are
166. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188; see also Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin,
700 F.3d 169, 180 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that the ministerial exception applied to church
pianist because “he played a role in furthering the mission of the church and conveying its
message to its congregants”).
167. See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 95, 120-21; Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 722-23
(1872).
168. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S 595, 602 (1979) (“[T]he [First] Amendment requires
that civil courts defer to the resolution of issues of religious doctrine or polity by the highest
court of a hierarchical church organization.”) (citing Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. 696, 724-25 (1976)).
169. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of U.S.C. titles 5, 28, 42, 52).
170. See 77 C.J.S. Religious Societies § 127 (2019).
171. See id.
172. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 178
(2012).
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not Catholic or who do not meet its standards of Catholic behavior
and belief—whatever those standards are.
The upshot for religious private schools’ vaccination policies
should by now be clear: a religious private school may reject vac-
cination exemptions as a matter of policy at least if its reasons for
doing so are sincerely rooted in religious doctrines or values. That
is, a school might sincerely assert that it is compelled by religious
tenets to require that all students be vaccinated, and that those who
are not vaccinated for nonmedical reasons would be denied admis-
sion because they are acting contrary to the school’s religious
mission and identity. Such a decision would be constitutionally
protected and would thereby trump a state statute that purported
to require private schools to accept vaccination exemptions on the
same terms required of public schools. The only court in the country
to extensively address this issue adopted an analysis that closely
tracks this one.173
It is hardly farfetched to posit that some religious schools may
indeed be sincerely and legitimately motivated to adopt such
policies for religious reasons. For example, some Catholic,174
Jewish,175 and Muslim176 religious authorities have asserted that
their adherents are obligated to vaccinate their children or that
there is religious value in doing so. They have rooted this assess-
ment in religious obligations or values to take care of one’s physical
health,177 or in a religion’s communitarian principle that requires
the strong to protect the weak or vulnerable.178
While a state court might be empowered to judge a religious
private school decision maker’s sincerity in adopting this kind of
interpretation and application of religious doctrine and values,179 it
173. See Flynn v. Estevez, 221 So. 3d 1241, 1243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (affirming a
religious school’s right to deny admission to a nonvaccinated student on religious grounds
despite student’s religious objection to vaccines).
174. See Grabenstein, supra note 105, at 2017-18; see also FAQ on the Use of Vaccines,
NAT’L CATHOLIC BIOETHICS CTR., https://www.ncbcenter.org/resources/frequently-asked-
questions/use-vaccines/ [https://perma.cc/C8Z3-BZ8N].
175. See Grabenstein, supra note 105, at 2014; see also Resolution on Mandatory
Immunization Laws, UNION FOR REFORM JUDAISM, https://urj.org/what-we-believe/
resolutions/resolution-mandatory-immunization-laws [https://perma.cc/HN3S-J9TN].
176. See Grabenstein, supra note 105, at 2016.
177. See, e.g., id. at 2014.
178. See id. at 2019.
179. See Chapman, supra note 87, at 1203.
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may certainly not question whether the interpretation or applica-
tion is a correct understanding of religious sources.180 To the extent
that a court might conduct a sincerity inquiry, indicia of sincerity
could include a statement explaining the religious reasons for
adopting the school’s policy; evidence that the decision was made by
the school’s religious decision makers rather than by its academic
administrators (if those responsibilities are not vested in the same
individual); a showing that the principle being cited as a religious
value expresses itself elsewhere in school policy or is taught to
students as part of their religious education; or, if the school is part
of a larger religious denomination, confirmation that the denomi-
nation’s religious authorities or texts support the policymaker’s
decision.181
The church autonomy doctrine may in fact go even further and
allow schools even more leeway. Justice Thomas’s concurrence in
Hosanna-Tabor would have adopted the expansive view that the
ministerial exception applies no matter the synagogue’s reasoning
for discriminating against a candidate for a ministerial position,
whether rooted in religion or not.182 This is a quasi-jurisdictional
approach to the ministerial doctrine that would assert that secular
courts simply have no place in adjudicating matters of ministerial
employment.183 It is possible that the same principle applies to
religious institutions’ membership decisions and to religious school
admissions criteria.184 If so, it would mean that such decisions can-
not be subject to state interference even if they are not rooted in
religious doctrine and values.185 Under this approach, a religious
private school could adopt a policy excluding unvaccinated children
180. See supra Part II.C.2 for discussion on sincerity.
181. I do not mean to suggest that any of these is necessary to demonstrate religious
sincerity. As I noted above, religious beliefs may be idiosyncratic and still be sincerely held.
See supra Part II.C.2. But to the extent that courts might seek evidence that corroborates or
supports a finding of sincerity, these might be the sorts of indicia that it would find sufficient.
182. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 196-97
(2012) (Thomas, J., concurring).
183. See id. 
184. See Flynn v. Estevez, 221 So. 3d 1241, 1246-47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (noting that
Florida courts have interpreted the ministerial exception as an “‘internal affairs’ doctrine”
that acts “as a jurisdictional bar ... upon a determination that it requires secular adjudication
of a religious matter”).
185. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196-97 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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from admission even without having to assert or demonstrate a
sincere religious reason for doing so.
In short, if a school’s admissions criteria are rooted in its religious
doctrines and values, then the state is certainly prohibited from
challenging those criteria; and, depending on whether the applica-
tion of the religious autonomy doctrine to church membership and
school admissions decisions is as robust as it is in the ministerial
context, then the state might be prohibited from challenging ad-
missions criteria. That is, a sincere religious motivation for insisting
on vaccination is certainly sufficient to bestow constitutional pro-
tection on its decision to reject vaccination exemptions; and it may
not even be necessary.
C. Associational Freedom: Nonreligious Organizations’
Conditional Freedom to Choose Their Members
The First Amendment’s Religion Clauses are not the only source
of a private organization’s right to exclude on grounds that would
otherwise be unlawful. So-called expressive organizations, though
not religious, share a similar right, grounded in the First Amend-
ment’s Free Speech Clause.186 In NAACP v. Alabama, the Supreme
Court held that the Free Speech Clause includes a right to associate
because, in many cases, people can only engage in effective speech
if they join with others who share their views.187 This right to
associate, in turn, necessitates a right not to associate—that is, to
refuse to allow some people to join a group. As the Court has
explained, “Forcing a group to accept certain members may impair
the ability of the group to express those views, and only those views,
that it intends to express. Thus, ‘[f]reedom of association ... plainly
presupposes a freedom not to associate.’”188 In other words, religious
groups’ right to exclude, grounded in the Religion Clauses is
paralleled by (some) secular organizations’ right to exclude,
grounded in the Free Speech Clause.
Consider: just as the Catholic Church may refuse membership to
non-Catholics (and, indeed, to determine who is and is not a
186. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
187. 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
188. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648 (second alteration in original) (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
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Catholic for the purposes of that organization),189 so too must the Ku
Klux Klan be free to exclude African Americans and others from
membership and the Boy Scouts of America to exclude gay scout-
masters.190
That said, the contours and reach of the associational freedom to
exclude are unclear. Who may exclude? And whom may they
exclude? Further, few courts have addressed whether private
schools enjoy this right and, if so, what it would allow. This Section
explores these questions and considers how associational rights
might apply to the vaccination context.
The Supreme Court most clearly confronted the associational
freedom to exclude in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.191 There, the
Court held that a state public accommodations law that prohibited
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation could not constitu-
tionally be invoked to force the Boy Scouts to accept an openly gay
assistant scoutmaster.192 As an expressive association founded “to
instill values in young people,”193 the Boy Scouts could not be forced
to include someone who “would significantly affect [its] ability to
advocate public or private viewpoints.”194 Because the Scouts
asserted that the values it promoted included an antigay message,
it would not have to accept anyone whose inclusion would signifi-
cantly interfere with or undermine that message.195
In determining whether the inclusion of a particular person would
affect the organization in this way, the Court sent mixed signals. On
the one hand, it noted that “an expressive association can[not] erect
a shield against antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that
mere acceptance of a member from a particular group would impair
its message.”196 On the other hand, the Court also asserted that it
must “give deference to an association’s view of what would impair
its expression.”197 These two statements are in some tension with
one another: Should a court scrutinize an association’s claim or not?
189. See 77 C.J.S. Religious Societies § 127 (2019).
190. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.
191. See id. at 644.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 649.
194. Id. at 650.
195. See id. at 650, 653.
196. Id. at 653.
197. Id.
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The Court did not offer an explicit rule or means of mediating
between these competing principles. Instead, it seems to have
implicitly taken the view that, if there is some objective logic that
supports the association’s assertion, then that assertion must be
credited.198 And on the facts of Dale, the Court agreed with the
Scouts’s claim.199 According to the Court, the presence of an assis-
tant scoutmaster who is “open and honest about” being gay, and
who is “a gay rights activist,” would “force the [Boy Scouts] to send
a message ... that [it] accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate
form of behavior.”200 The Court concluded that sending this message
would interfere with and undermine the Boy Scouts’s own antigay
messages.201
Finally, the Court considered whether the state’s interest in
prohibiting discrimination outweighed the association’s interest in
exclusion.202 The Court concluded that it did not.203
Putting all of this together then, the associational right to exclude
applies when the following conditions are met: (1) the organization
is an expressive one; (2) it wishes to transmit a particular message;
(3) it will not be able to effectively transmit this message if it is
forced to include certain people; and (4) its interest in exclusion is
not outweighed by the public’s interest in inclusion.
How do these elements apply to private schools in the context of
vaccination policies? The first two conditions are relatively easy to
assess. First, it would be difficult to argue that a private school
cannot be an expressive organization. A school is nothing if not an
organization organized to transmit a message. Furthermore, private
schools are often—perhaps always—founded around a mission to
inculcate certain values among their students. One private school’s
mission is to “create a community of engaged global leaders dedicat-
ed to the values of respect, responsibility, citizenship, and justice.”204
Another is committed to “developing critical thinkers and ethical
problem solvers, in an inclusive community, rich in opportunities
198. See id. at 651-52.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 653.
201. Id.
202. See id. at 658-59.
203. See id. at 659.
204. Mission and Vision, MIDTOWN INT’L SCH., https://www.midtowninternational
school.com/mission-vision-promise.html [https://perma.cc/V3CB-78VZ].
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for student success.”205 Other mission statements speak of inter-
personal ethics, empathy, care for the environment, individualism,
science, and more.206 (Frankly, I have not found a single private
school that, based on mission and value statements, should not
qualify as an expressive association.) This reasoning finds strong
support in Supreme Court opinions that accept that private
universities can qualify as expressive associations,207 and at least
two lower courts have assumed the same about private primary
schools.208
The second condition—that the organization wishes to transmit
a particular message (in this case, concerning the necessity of vac-
cination)—is similarly easy to assess and is likely met in some
cases. As the Court in Dale made clear, the expressive organization
may determine for itself what its messages are, and they may not be
second-guessed by a court.209 At the same time, though, the Court
sought and found evidence to corroborate the Boy Scouts’s claim
that its messages included an antigay viewpoint.210 Private schools
that espouse communitarian values, personal health and well-being,
or the importance of science and medicine may have little trouble
connecting these values to a mandatory vaccination policy. However,
they would be wise to make this connection explicit and express
these values and the vaccination policy in a clear and consistent
manner.211
Thus, for example, a private school that espouses the communi-
tarian value that each person in a community is responsible for the
welfare of every other person could reasonably assert that vaccina-
tion is a natural expression of this value. After all, the phenomenon
of vaccine-enabled community immunity allows the strong (in this
case, those who can be vaccinated) to protect the vulnerable (those
who cannot be immunized)—a clear example of communitarian
205. Our Mission & Vision, WOODWARD ACAD., https://www.woodward.edu/about/whowe
are/mission [https://perma.cc/9G5P-EFPZ].
206. See, e.g., School Mission Statements, supra note 56.
207. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 55, 68-70
(2006).
208. See, e.g., Circle Sch. v. Pappert, 381 F.3d 172, 182 (3d Cir. 2004).
209. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 651 (2000).
210. Id. at 651-52.
211. See id. at 676 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“At a minimum, a group seeking to prevail over
an antidiscrimination law must adhere to a clear and unequivocal view.”).
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values.212 But the school would do well to go further. It should make
this connection clear by teaching the relationship between vaccina-
tion and its values, and it would also do well to demonstrate other
ways in which these values are taught.
Likewise, a school that roots its mandatory vaccination policy in
a value of physical health must make that connection clear, and, for
the sake of demonstrating a sincere and consistent commitment to
this value, it should be able to show how else the school expresses
it. For example, does the school have a robust physical education
program? Does it employ a school nurse? Does instruction in per-
sonal health feature in its curriculum? Do its teachers explain how
vaccinations work and how many lives vaccines have saved? If so,
a private school could reasonably claim that mandatory vaccination
is part of the core message it wishes to send to its students and
community.
The third condition is likely more difficult to meet. Would the
mere presence of a child who is unvaccinated for nonmedical
reasons substantially interfere with or inhibit the school’s ability to
send its message? A strong case can be made that it would not, at
least in many cases. There would be no reason for anyone in the
school community to know that a particular child is unvaccinated
for nonmedical reasons. This is legally protected personal health
information.213 If no one is aware that a child is unvaccinated, then
how could his presence undermine the school’s message about the
importance and necessity of vaccination? The school could still send
its provaccination message, even if particular parents choose to
ignore it.
This argument finds support in the Supreme Court’s opinions in
Roberts v. United States Jaycees214 and Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Academic & Institutional Rights.215 In Roberts, the Court held that
an organization whose mission was to “pursue ‘such educational and
charitable purposes as will promote and foster the growth and
212. See David Isaacs, An Ethical Framework for Public Health Immunisation Programs,
23 NSW PUB. HEALTH BULL. 111, 114 (2012).
213. See generally Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g
(2012); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-90, 110
Stat. 1936.
214. 468 U.S. 609, 627-28 (1984).
215. 547 U.S. 47, 64 (2006).
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development of young men’s civic organizations’” must allow women
as members.216 The Court reasoned that there was no reason to
conclude “that admission of women ... will impede the organization’s
ability to ... disseminate its preferred views.”217 Similarly, in
Rumsfeld, the Court upheld a law that required law schools to allow
military recruiters access to campus hiring opportunities on a level
playing field with other employers.218 The law schools argued that
the military’s antigay policies219 conflicted with the schools’
expressive value of gay equality.220 The Court rejected this argu-
ment, reasoning that the law schools could continue to express their
disagreement with the military’s policy in whatever manner they
wished, and the mere presence of military recruiters on campus did
not undermine this message.221 The Court seemed to distinguish
Dale on the grounds that the inclusion of an openly gay assistant
scoutmaster—a leadership position within the scouting hierarchy—
would express a message that directly conflicted with the Scouts’s
own antigay message.222
However, there are two potential bases for challenging this
analysis and arguing that, in some cases, the presence of non-
vaccinated students would undermine a school’s provaccination
message. First, some parents who choose not to vaccinate their
children do so openly, engaging in antivaccination advocacy. These
parents would be similar to the assistant scoutmaster in Dale,
whose presence as an openly gay man and a gay rights activist on
his college campus would have (according to the Court) conflicted
216. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612.
217. Id. at 627.
218. See 547 U.S. at 70.
219. Id. at 52 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000)). At the time, the policy was “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell.” See DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE ISSUES ASSOCIATED
WITH A REPEAL OF “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL,” 1 (2010). This statute has since been repealed.
See Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, §§ 1-2, 124 Stat. 3515,
3515-17.
220. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 68.
221. Id. at 69-70. Note that the Court in Rumsfeld also found it significant that the
universities were not being compelled to accept the military recruiters as members of their
communities but rather as outsiders who were allowed on campus for a limited purpose. Id.
at 69. This could distinguish Rumsfeld from the context of private school admissions policies.
However, Roberts, did require the inclusion of women as members, Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628,
and so it is not altogether clear that this factor is dispositive.
222. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 69-70.
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with, undermined, and degraded the Scouts’s antigay message. A
private school would have a strong argument that parents who
choose to speak openly or publicly about their choices not to
vaccinate could not enroll their children in the school because their
antivaccination advocacy would conflict with, undermine, and
degrade the school’s own message. After all, an observer might hear
the school preach the importance and necessity of vaccination, only
to dismiss it as empty words upon discovering that children in the
school were not, in fact, vaccinated.
Second, and more broadly, although nonvaccinated students are
not individually identified, private schools in most or all states are
required to report their vaccination rates and the reasons—medical
or nonmedical—for nonvaccination to public health departments.223
This information is then made public.224 Publicly available informa-
tion that students are unvaccinated for nonmedical reasons in a
school that preaches the importance of vaccination could similarly
undermine a school’s provaccination message. Therefore, schools
might meet the third element necessary to assert their associational
right to exclude.225
Finally, the fourth element that schools would have to meet in
order to claim an associational right to exclude nonvaccinators—
the balancing of the public’s interest against the association’s
private interests—should easily fall in favor of private schools’
interest in requiring vaccination of all students. The Supreme Court
and state and lower courts have consistently held that state vacci-
nation mandates, with or without exemptions, are presumptively
valid, and would even pass strict scrutiny, because of the impor-
tance of public health.226 Surely a private school has a similarly
strong, or even stronger, argument given the nature of a private
223. See School VaxView for Health Care Professionals/Providers, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/imz-managers/coverage/schoolvax
view/groups/hcp.html [https://perma.cc/R77C-RVD3].
224. See VaxView, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
vaccines/vaxview/ [https://perma.cc/UE69-6CUE].
225. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
226. Mary Holland, Compulsory Vaccination, the Constitution, and the Hepatitis B Mandate
for Infants and Young Children, 12 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 39, 48-54 (2012).
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school community,227 its interest in the health of its students,228 and
its commitment to avoiding disease outbreaks.229 It would be
difficult to take seriously an argument that these interests are
outweighed by a generalized public interest in parental rights,
freedom of conscience, and general libertarian values, particularly
given that no one has a right to attend a private school in the first
place.230
The upshot of all of this is that at least some private schools—
those whose messages and values compel them to require vaccina-
tion—might have an associational right rooted in the Free Speech
Clause to do so.
D. Putting It All Together
In short, the picture is this:
• In five states, nonmedical exemptions are prohibited for public
and private schools.231 Here, private schools must refuse admis-
sion to students who are nonvaccinated for nonmedical reasons.232
• In New Jersey, religious schools have a statutory right to exclude
unvaccinated students, but other private schools do not.233
• In some states, private schools may have a statutory right to
exclude students who are nonvaccinated, but the statutes and
courts have not been clear on this question.234 Meanwhile, in
227. See, e.g., Benefits of Private Schools, OUR KIDS, https://www.ourkids.net/
school/benefits-of-private-schools.php [https://perma.cc/L2QX-EAKA].
228. See, e.g., Private Schools: General Information, OR. DEP’T EDUC., https://www.oregon.
gov/ode/schools-and-districts/grants/ESEA/pages/private-schools-gen-info.aspx
[https://perma.cc/429Q-ZGJ8].
229. See generally Sarah H. Fay, Immunizations and Communicable Diseases: What
Independent Schools Need to Know, SCHWARTZ HANNUM PC (June 2019),
http://www.shpclaw.com/immunizations-and-communicable-diseases-what-independent-
schools-need-to-know [https://perma.cc/PL8F-RZFE].
230. See Nina Walton, The Price of Admission: Who Gets into Private School, and How
Much Do They Pay?, 29 ECON. EDUC. REV. 738, 739 (2010).
231. See supra note 65 and accompanying text; see also NAT’L CONFERENCE ST.
LEGISLATURES, supra note 38.
232. See supra note 65 and accompanying text; see also NAT’L CONFERENCE ST.
LEGISLATURES, supra note 38.
233. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
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other states, the statutes and courts have stated or assumed that
there is no such statutory right.235 
• Schools in some states may conduct sincerity inquiries that may
result in the exclusion of some nonvaccinated students, but the
utility of such inquiries may be limited.236
• Religious private schools that are motivated by sincere religious
beliefs and values have a constitutional right rooted in the
Religion Clauses to exclude students who are nonvaccinated for
nonmedical reasons.237 Religious private schools that are moti-
vated purely by secular concerns might enjoy this right at well.238
• Private schools for whom mandatory vaccination serves an
expressive function that is aligned with their values and missions
might have a constitutional right rooted in the Free Speech
Clause to adopt an exclusionary policy.239
• States that allow religious exemptions, but not parallel philosoph-
ical exemptions, likely violate the Establishment Clause.240 If
courts were to agree with this analysis, then private schools in
these states could adopt whatever policies they wish.
IV. TROUBLING IMPLICATIONS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
My analysis provides clarity for some private schools, and for
others, it offers a framework for assessing their legal options and
risks in deciding whether to adopt policies that exclude non-
vaccinated students from admission. But this is not sufficient
because the status quo raises practical and philosophical problems.
This Section briefly exposes these problems and then offers a
legislative solution, as well as partial judicial and administrative
solutions.
235. See supra Part II.B.
236. See supra Part II.C.
237. See supra Part III.A-B.
238. See supra Part III.B.2.
239. See supra Part III.C.
240. See supra note 65.
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A. The Problems with the Current State of Affairs
As a practical matter, the lack of clarity is troubling. Of course,
lack of clarity is a problem faced by litigants and potential litigants
in all areas of the law.241 Indeed, it is why (some) lawyers are paid
so well—if the law were clear, lawyers would be largely unneces-
sary.242 But lack of clarity is more troubling when it affects those
who are relatively resource poor than when it affects those who are
resource rich.243 Wealth allows for the greater assumption of risk
associated with lack of clarity, whereas those without wealth often
cannot afford to assume the cost and risk they face when they take
steps that may be challenged in the courts.244 To be sure, many
private schools can hardly be described as poor. After all, they are
attended and supported by people of relative means.245 But their
resources are usually devoted to their primary missions of educating
their students, and they often do not enjoy the resources necessary
to support the cost and risk taking associated with potential
litigation.246 If nothing else, it would be fairer to them to offer
clarity—one way or another—as to what their rights are.
Second, as a philosophical matter, the differences in treatment
between religious and nonreligious private schools is problematic.
Recall that religious schools get to set any religious conditions for
admission that they choose, and, depending on the application of the
church autonomy doctrine, possibly even nonreligious conditions.247
241. See Ryan Mize, From Plausibility to Clarity: An Analysis of the Implications of
Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Possible Remedies, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1245, 1262 (2010) (noting that
many legal doctrines are plagued by lack of clarity). See generally Scott Dodson, The
Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1 (2011).
242. See Himani Singh, Language of Law—Ambiguities and Interpretation, 2 AM. INT’L J.
RES. HUMAN. ARTS SOC. SCI. 122, 122, 125-26 (2013) (noting that “law is a profession of words”
and it is lawyers’ jobs to parse through the ambiguous nature and lack of clarity in legal
language).
243. See generally Albert Yoon, The Importance of Litigant Wealth, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 649,
652 (2010) (studying the effects of differing levels of wealth on litigants).
244. Id. at 669 (arguing that the current legal system disfavors those with resource
constraints because resource-poor litigants who bring suit “may find that wealthier
defendants can exploit their resource advantage ... to prevail or resolve the dispute on
favorable terms”).
245. Richard J. Murnane et al., Who Goes to Private School?, 18 EDUC. NEXT 59, 66 (2018).
246. BRUCE D. BAKER, PRIVATE SCHOOLING IN THE U.S.: EXPENDITURES, SUPPLY, AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS 32-33 (2009).
247. See supra Part III.B.2.
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In contrast, nonreligious schools, if they have any associational
right to exclude at all, may only exclude those whose presence would
directly undermine their ability to spread their values.248 Similarly,
recall that once religious autonomy applies, religious institutions
are entirely free from state oversight in that particular area;
whereas expressive associational freedom allows for an interest
balancing test that may favor the state’s interests over the associa-
tion’s interest in maintaining fidelity to its expressive goals.249 But
why should this be? Why should a religious school that asserts a
religious motivation for rejecting nonvaccinated students, or per-
haps a nonreligious reason altogether, be treated differently from a
nonreligious institution that asserts parallel philosophical reasons
for doing so?
Third, the idea that a private school (religious or not) could not
exclude students on the basis of nonvaccination undermines the
fundamental meaning of what it means to be a private school.
Except in rare circumstances, private schools may choose their own
students. Of course, there are reasonable critiques of the idea of
private education.250 It may be troubling that people of means can
opt out of the standard educational model that those without such
means are offered.251 It may perpetuate class and racial divides,252
and it may make public schools worse off by removing the most
engaged stakeholders from the public school ecosystem.253 But the
reality is that we do allow private schools to exist, and we do allow
them to select their student bodies on the basis of all kinds of
criteria: wealth, academic ability, family fit, personality, connec-
tions, values, and more. Why would we deny them the ability to
select their student body on the basis of vaccination status and an
248. See supra Part III.C.
249. See supra Part III.B.
250. E.g., Yossi Dahan, Privatization, School Choice and Educational Equality, 5 LAW &
ETHICS HUM. RTS. 307, 308 (2011) (“[C]onsiderations of fairness, as well as utility, solidarity,
and democracy supply strong reasons for rejecting various arguments that support the
existence of private schools.”).
251. Id. at 310.
252. See id. at 319-20; see also Daniel Kiel, No Caste Here? Toward a Structural Critique
of American Education, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. 611, 622 (2015).
253. See Dahan, supra note 250, at 310; Diane Ravitch, Charter Schools Damage Public
Education, WASH. POST (June 22, 2018, 1:37 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/charter-schools-are-leading-to-an-unhealthy-divide-in-american-education/2018/
06/22/73430df8-7016-11e8-afd5-778aca903bbe_story.html [https://perma.cc/5ZDX-RBJY].
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interest in protecting their school community from the spread of
deadly disease? This would be an odd and unreasonable place to
draw the line.
Finally, the stakes for children here are high. There is no reason
that a developed country should be experiencing a spike in danger-
ous vaccine-preventable diseases.254 There are vigorous debates and
proposals concerning how to reverse this trend on national and
statewide bases,255 and that is a good thing. But in the meanwhile,
children are needlessly suffering. Why would we ever prevent mi-
crocommunities such as private schools from adopting policies to
protect the students that they can from these unnecessary illnesses?
To be clear, my argument is not that private schools must adopt
exclusionary policies; if they are made to do so, it should be because
all schools, public and private (and perhaps even home-based), are
mandated to do so. But schools should at least have the option to do
so.
For these reasons, the law should provide clarity. And not just
clarity; it should pick a side by clearly affirming the right of all
private schools to reject students who are not vaccinated for
nonmedical reasons.
B. Legislative, Administrative, and Judicial Solutions
The ideal resolution would be for state legislatures to change
their statutes to state explicitly that private schools may choose to
reject students who are not vaccinated for nonmedical reasons.
Using language drawn from a comprehensive model statute con-
cerning state vaccination laws that I and coauthors have offered, a
new subsection should be added to state vaccination laws, stating:
Nothing shall be construed as to require private schools, private
childcare facilities or private camps to accept nonmedical
exemptions for any or all vaccinations required by the [Depart-
ment of Health]. Private schools, private childcare facilities, and
254. See What Would Happen if We Stopped Vaccinations?, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vac-gen/whatifstop.htm [https://perma.cc/HBZ4-
HYPG]; Diseases You Almost Forgot About (Thanks to Vaccines), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/parents/diseases/diseases-forgot.html [https://
perma.cc/SQJ9-L9PA].
255. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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private camps may elect whether or not to accept nonmedical
exemptions as outlined [in] this section. Private schools, private
childcare facilities, and private camps must clearly state if
nonmedical exemptions will not be accepted in the school or
facility’s admissions agreements or contracts to be signed by a
parent or legal guardian of the child, emancipated student or
student aged 18 years or older.256
That said, unless and until states amend their statutes, there are
two other approaches that would improve the status quo, albeit
imperfectly.
As explained earlier, some state statutes are written in a way
that could be interpreted to mean that private schools are not
required to accept nonmedical vaccination exemptions. For example,
Georgia’s statute imposes vaccination mandates, and then exempts
those with religious exemptions, stating that “[t]his Code section
shall not apply to a child whose parent or legal guardian objects to
immunization of the child on the grounds that the immunization
conflicts with the religious beliefs of the parent or guardian.”257
A strong case can be made that the plain meaning of this
provision simply frees private schools to set exemption policies as
they please. The “Code section” referred to is the broader statutory
section that imposes the vaccination mandate in the first place.258 In
the event that a student has a bona fide religious exemption, then
the code section mandating vaccination falls away, as though it had
never existed. If there had never been a statutory vaccination
mandate in the first place, private schools would be able to insist on
their own vaccination requirements, just as they may impose many
other conditions for admission and attendance. Therefore, they
remain free to adopt exclusionary policies for those whose religious
exemptions would entitle them to attend public school. That is, the
exemption is not an affirmative requirement that private schools
accept such exemptions.
256. Hillel Y. Levin et al., Stopping the Resurgence of Vaccine-Preventable Childhood
Diseases: Policy, Politics, and Law, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 233, 266. Of course, states should
adapt this language to align with their already existing statutory language.
257. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-771(e) (2013).
258. See id.
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Courts in states with statutes such as Georgia’s have tended to
(mistakenly) interpret or assume them to require private schools to
accept nonmedical exemptions on the same footing as must public
schools.259 But if courts are presented with an appropriate case, they
should reject that interpretation and instead adopt the one I have
offered. First, it is the more natural reading of the statute. Second,
even if the statute is ambiguous, courts generally adopt an interpre-
tation that avoids raising constitutional problems and, all the more,
a reading that allows them to avoid striking down a statutory
provision as unconstitutional.260 By adopting the reading I have
offered, courts could avoid grappling with the constitutional argu-
ments outlined above—and thus avoid a reading that requires the
court to strike down the provision as unconstitutional when applied
to private schools.261
Unfortunately, relying on judicial interpretation is less than
ideal, because it is limited in both application and utility. First,
courts can only adopt this interpretation in those states with
statutes similar to Georgia’s, and not in those states with statutes
that more clearly seem to require private schools to accept non-
medical exemptions. Second, our judicial system requires, of course,
that a dispute over the statute’s meaning arise in order for the
courts to intervene at all.262 This means that a private school would
have to adopt an exclusionary policy and subject itself to a costly
lawsuit with an uncertain outcome. It may be reticent to do so—
particularly given that some courts have not adopted this interpre-
tation—and thereby be dissuaded from taking steps to prevent
illness from spreading among its students. It would be preferable to
provide ex ante assurances, something the courts are not empow-
ered to do.
There is a third solution that would at least provide ex ante
assurance to private schools, though it would still be limited in
259. See supra Part II.B.
260. Gomez v. U.S., 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989) (“It is ... settled policy to avoid an
interpretation of a federal statute that engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable
alternative interpretation poses no constitutional question.”).
261. It would be unconstitutional for privileging religious children, parents, and guardians,
over the many more nonreligious.
262. VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45153, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
THEORIES, TOOLS, AND TRENDS 2 (2018) (noting that statutory interpretation by courts does
not begin until a dispute over the statute arises).
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application to states with statutes such as Georgia’s. States typical-
ly delegate authority to their health departments to implement their
vaccination mandates.263 In carrying out their responsibilities, state
health departments should, where possible, issue interpretive rules
that affirm the right of private schools to adopt exclusionary policies
for students who are not vaccinated for nonmedical reasons. It is not
the ideal solution, but until states amend their statutes, it will help,
and persuading a health department to do this may be easier to
achieve than persuading a state legislature.
CONCLUSION: BEYOND VACCINATION POLICY
This Article focuses on the problem of antivaccination and the
degree to which private schools can be a part of the solution. But the
analysis raises much broader questions about the degree to which
states may regulate private schools—and the degree to which
private schools have constitutional freedoms that trump state
regulation.
If the First Amendment’s Speech and Religion Clauses allow some
private schools to be free from state interference in developing their
vaccination policies, what other state laws governing private schools
might be trumped by their constitutional rights? Some states’
regulations of private schools are relatively expansive, while others
are minimal.264 States impose requirements concerning a range of
activities, including licensing, curriculum, testing, teacher certifica-
tion, reporting, antidiscrimination, and more.265 What if schools’
religious or philosophical values conflict with such regulations?
This question raises complex questions of constitutional law and
theory that warrant further attention. Not everyone will like the
answers. For example, religious or nonreligious private schools
likely have a constitutional right, in at least some cases, to exclude
263. Richard J. Pan & Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Vaccine Medical Exemptions Are a Delegated
Public Health Authority, PEDIATRICS, Nov. 2018, at 1-2, https://pediatrics.aappublications.org/
content/pediatrics/142/5/e20182009.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NJF-Q5XL]; Kevin M. Malone
& Alan R. Hinman, Vaccination Mandates: The Public Health Imperative and Individual
Rights, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/imz-
managers/guides-pubs/downloads/ vacc_mandates_chptr13.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8HR-J5TA].
264. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STATE REGULATION OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS 326-31 (2009), https://
www2.ed.gov/admins/comm/choice/regprivschl/regprivschl.pdf [https://perma.cc/HK2E-C2GN].
265. Id.
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LGBTQ students or teachers, which may displease many who
oppose such discrimination.266
But this is what it means to live and work within a constitutional
order that allows and encourages a degree of religious and associ-
ational autonomy. Perhaps some of the same people who are
displeased by schools’ rights to discriminate in one context will
appreciate that these same rights may also be used in the context
of vaccination policies to protect some vulnerable students.
266. See discussion of church autonomy and expressive association rights supra Part III.C.
